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INTRODUCTION
In 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(“Federal Circuit”) decided numerous cases demonstrating the varied
nature of the cases appealed from the United States Court of
International Trade (“CIT”). These cases included appeals to the
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CIT from United States Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”),
the United States Department of Commerce (“Commerce”), and the
United States International Trade Commission (“ITC”).
Since its inception in 1982, the Federal Circuit has exercised its
jurisdiction over cases appealed from the CIT pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1
§ 1295(a)(5). This broad grant of appellate jurisdiction is apparent
in the wide variety of cases the Federal Circuit hears. The complexity
of these cases has continued to grow with numerous tariff
classification and drawback cases, trade remedy cases, and
jurisdictional issue cases, among others.
This Article reviews those cases decided by the Federal Circuit in
2007 dealing with international trade matters. Many cases decided by
the Federal Circuit had complex procedural histories and turned on
particular factual issues. However, some of the cases decided in 2007
also had broader implications that potentially will affect agency
decision-making for years to come. The case summaries highlight the
issues the Federal Circuit faced in 2007, broken down into the two
major areas of the court’s international trade jurisdiction—customs
laws and trade remedies laws.
I.

CUSTOMS

As in previous years, in 2007, Customs cases represented a large
number of international trade cases decided by the Federal Circuit.
Since 2003, when Customs was reorganized as an agency within the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Circuit’s purview
has centered primarily on Customs’ functions of “[a]ssessing and
collecting Customs duties, excise taxes, fees and penalties due on
2
imported merchandise.” In the 2007 term, the Federal Circuit heard
cases involving tariff classification matters, and a wide range of other
customs-related matters, including duty drawback and jurisdictional
disputes.
A. Tariff Classification
The Federal Circuit decided seven classification cases in 2007. In
classification cases, importers and Customs disagree about the proper
classification of imported goods under the provisions of the

1. “The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from a final decision of the United States Court of
International Trade.” 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (2000).
2. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Customs Service, http://www.cbp.
gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/about/history/history2.xml (last visited Feb. 13, 2008).
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3

Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”).
Because the HTSUS classification of imported goods determines the
rate of duty that will be assessed on the goods, importers want the
goods classified in an HTSUS provision with a lower duty rate than
that in a potentially applicable alternative provision.
4
In Optrex America, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit addressed
the classification of a variety of liquid crystal displays (“LCDs”)
5
imported by Optrex America, Inc. (“Optrex”). These LCDs included
alphanumeric modules, graphic modules, and glass sandwiches (or
6
panels), used in a number of different settings. While Customs
liquidated the imports under various subheadings, including
8531.20.00 and 9013.80.70, of the HTSUS, the CIT ultimately found
in favor of Customs’ counterclaims to reclassify certain imports under
7
8
9
Optrex
subheadings 9013.80.70, 9013.80.90, and 8537.10.90.
appealed, contending that its goods are classifiable as parts of
automatic data processing (“ADP”) machines, classifiable under

3. OFFICE OF TARIFF AFFAIRS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS, HARMONIZED TARIFF
SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (2007); see, e.g., Optrex Am., Inc. v. United States,
475 F.3d 1367, 1367–72 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (deciding a dispute between Optrex and
Customs regarding the classification of Optrex’s imports under the provisions of the
HTSUS).
4. 475 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
5. Id. at 1367–68.
6. Id. at 1368.
7. Subheading 9013.80.70 covers “Liquid crystal devices not constituting articles
provided for more specifically in other headings; lasers, other than laser diodes;
other optical appliances and instruments, not specified or included elsewhere in this
chapter; parts and accessories thereof: Flat panel displays other than for articles of
heading 8528, except subheadings 8528.51 or 8528.61.” Harmonized Tariff
Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (2000), Subheading
9013.80.70. The HTSUS is codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1202, but is not published in the
Code. Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 3007, the HTSUS is published, as annotated for
statistical reporting purposes, by the U.S. International Trade Commission. See
United States International Trade Commission, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the
United States, available at http://www.usitc.gov (follow “Tariff Schedule” hyperlink).
8. Subheading 9013.80.90 covers “Liquid crystal devices not constituting articles
provided for more specifically in other headings; lasers, other than laser diodes;
other optical appliances and instruments, not specified or included elsewhere in this
chapter; parts and accessories thereof: Other.” Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the
United States, 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (2000), Subheading 9013.80.90.
9. Optrex, 475 F.3d at 1369. Subheading 8537.10.90 covers
Boards, panels, consoles, desks, cabinets and other bases, equipped with two
or more apparatus of heading 8535 or 8536, for electric control or the
distribution of electricity, including those incorporating instruments or
apparatus of chapter 90, and numerical control apparatus, other than
switching apparatus of heading 8517: For a voltage not exceeding 1,000 V:
Other.
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (2000),
Subheading 8537.10.90.
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heading 8471, and ADP machine parts, classifiable under heading
10
8473.
Heading 8473 states that, “[t]o be classified as an ADP machine
part, an import must be ‘suitable for use solely or principally with’
11
ADP machines.” The Notes to Chapter 84 define ADP machines as:
Digital machines, capable of (1) storing the processing program or
programs and at least the data immediately necessary for execution
of the program; (2) being freely programmed in accordance with
the requirements of the user; (3) performing arithmetical
computations specified by the user; and (4) and [sic] executing,
without human intervention, a processing program which requires
them to modify their execution, by logical decision during the
12
processing run . . . .

The Federal Circuit found that, because Optrex failed to prove that
its imports are solely or principally incorporated into machines
meeting the second and third criteria listed above, the CIT correctly
determined that they were not properly classified as parts of ADP
13
machines under heading 8473.
The Federal Circuit denied Optrex’s appeal for a number of
reasons. First, the court found that “Optrex ha[d] not established
that any of its imports are incorporated into devices that are freely
14
programmed in accordance with the requirements of the user.”
The court agreed with Customs’ interpretation of the “freely
15
programmable” requirement, and this interpretation was also
16
supported by the World Customs Organization’s Explanatory Notes.
Second, Optrex failed to establish that any of its imports were
incorporated solely or principally into machines that are capable of
17
performing arithmetical computations specified by the user. Once

10. Optrex, 475 F.3d at 1369.
11. Id. (citing OFFICE OF TARIFF AFFAIRS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS, HARMONIZED
TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES, Heading 8473 (2006)).
12. Id. (citing OFFICE OF TARIFF AFFAIRS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS, HARMONIZED
TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES, Chapter 84, Note 5(A)(a) (2006)).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1370 (citing U.S. Customs & Border Protection, Customs Headquarters
Ruling No. 964880 (Dec. 21, 2001)) (“Customs believes that a freely programmable
ADP machine is one that applications can be written for, does not impose artificial
limitations upon such applications, and will accept new applications that allow the user
to manipulate the data as deemed necessary by the user.” (emphasis added)).
16. Id. (“[M]achines which operate only on fixed programs, that is programs
which cannot be modified by the user, are excluded [from heading 8471] even
though the user may be able to choose between a number of such fixed programs.”
(citing CUSTOMS CO-OPERATION COUNCIL, HARMONIZED COMMODITY DESCRIPTION AND
CODING SYSTEM, Explanatory Note 84.71(I)(A) (2d ed. 1996))).
17. Id.
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the CIT determined that none of the imports were classifiable under
heading 8473, it classified the imported LCDs under either heading
8531 (signaling devices), 8537 (control panels), or 9013 (LCDs not
constituting articles provided for more specifically in other
18
headings). The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s classification of:
certain graphic display modules as control panels under subheading
19
8537.10.90, all character display models capable of displaying eighty
20
or less characters as indicator panels under subheading 8531.20.00,
and certain LCD panels and character display modules capable of
21
displaying more than eighty characters under subheading 9013.
While this finding was based on a Customs classification policy that
was merely a guideline and not a rigid rule, Optrex did not present
any evidence showing that its imported character display modules
22
Therefore, the Federal Circuit
were not limited to signaling.
affirmed the CIT’s decision in favor of Customs’ classification of the
23
LCDs.
24
BASF Corp. v. United States involved the tariff classification of
Lucarotin® 1% (“Lucarotin”), a food colorant containing one
25
percent beta-carotene.
In this case, both the importer BASF
Corporation (“BASF”) and the government appealed the decision of
the CIT, which held that Lucarotin was classifiable under subheading
3204.19.35 of the HTSUS (“Beta-carotene and other carotene
26
coloring matter”). BASF argued that the product was entitled to
duty-free treatment because beta-carotene is listed on the duty-free
27
Pharmaceutical Appendix of the HTSUS. The government crossappealed, stating that the correct classification of Lucarotin is as a
beta-carotene “preparation not otherwise specified” under
28
subheading 3204.19.40 or 3204.19.50. The Federal Circuit affirmed

18. Id.
19. See id. at 1371 n.4 (finding no error in the classification because the display
modules contained touch panels).
20. See id. at 1371 (applying Customs’ eighty character rule by considering all
LCD modules capable of displaying eighty characters or less as being operationally
limited to performing signaling functions, and determining that while this was
merely a guideline and not a rigid rule, Optrex did not present any evidence
showing that its imported character display modules were not limited to signaling).
21. See id. at 1371–72 (finding no error in the CIT’s classification of these LCDs
as LCDs “not constituting articles provided for more specifically in other headings”).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1372.
24. 482 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
25. Id. at 1325.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.

1150

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1145

the CIT’s decision to classify Lucarotin under subheading 3204.19.35
29
of the HTSUS.
In finding against BASF, the Federal Circuit held that the CIT’s
classification under subheading 3204.19.35 of the HTSUS prevailed
30
over the listing of beta-carotene on the Pharmaceutical Appendix.
Lucarotin’s use as a food colorant, and not as a vitamin, was never
31
disputed. The CIT found that Lucarotin’s use did not comply with
32
the ITC’s definition of a pharmaceutical product, and found that
customers only bought the product for its properties as a food
33
colorant. Ultimately, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s holding
that Lucarotin was not eligible for duty-free importation despite the
34
listing of beta-carotene on the Pharmaceutical Appendix.
In finding against the government, the Federal Circuit held that
the CIT’s classification under subheading 3204.19.35 was correct
because the classification as “Beta-carotene and other carotenoid
coloring matter” was more specific than the government’s proposed
classification under 3204.19.40 or 3204.19.50 as a beta-carotene
35
“preparation not otherwise specified.” The Federal Circuit relied on
HTSUS General Rule of Interpretation (“GRI”) 3 to guide its
36
analysis. GRI 3(a) states that “[t]he heading which provides the
most specific description shall be preferred to headings providing a
37
more general description.”
GRI 3(b) states that mixtures or
composite goods which cannot be classified by reference to 3(a)
“shall be classified as if they consisted of the material or the
38
component which gives them their essential character.” Therefore,
the Federal Circuit concluded that the “most specific description”
criterion of GRI 3(a) and/or the “essential character” criterion of
29. Id. at 1327.
30. See id. (asserting that the CIT’s decision represented “the clearest and most
direct application of the HTSUS provision of a separate tariff category for betacarotene coloring matter”).
31. Id. at 1326.
32. Id. (explaining that “[t]he CIT applied the International Trade
Commission’s . . . definition of a pharmaceutical product as ‘used in the prevention,
diagnosis, alleviation, treatment, or cure of disease in humans or animals’”).
33. See id. (asserting that the purpose of Lucarotin as a method of delivering a
beta-carotene colorant was undisputed).
34. Id. at 1326–27.
35. Id. at 1327.
36. Id.
37. See id. (citing OFFICE OF TARIFF AFFAIRS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS, HARMONIZED
TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES, General Rule of Interpretation 3(a) (2007)
(preferring the “heading which provides the most specific description”)).
38. See id. (citing OFFICE OF TARIFF AFFAIRS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS, HARMONIZED
TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES, General Rule of Interpretation 3(b) (2007)
(classifying mixtures “as if they consisted of the material or the component which
gives them their essential character”)).
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GRI 3(b) compelled the classification of Lucarotin under subheading
39
The government’s contention that Lucarotin is a
3204.19.35.
“preparation” therefore did not carry much weight in light of the fact
that subheading 3204.19.35 was plainly the more specific of the
40
potential classifications.
41
In another BASF Corp. v. United States case, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the CIT’s decision to classify the imported chemical
polyisobutylene amine (“PIBA”) under subheading 3811.90.00 of the
42
After importing PIBA, BASF added other chemicals to
HTSUS.
form a finished detergent control package, which was then added to
gasoline engines to remove and prevent the buildup of harmful
43
BASF argued that the product was not prima facie
deposits.
classifiable under heading 3811 (prepared additives for mineral oils
(including gasoline)) and should be classified in subheading
44
3902.20.50 (classifying chemicals by structure).
The Federal Circuit rejected BASF’s argument, finding that PIBA
45
was prima facie classifiable under heading 3811. In its analysis, the
court found that, while the imported PIBA was not directly added to
engines itself, “its detergent properties render[ed] it useful as a
gasoline additive so long as other materials [were] added at the same
46
time.” Additionally, the Federal Circuit held that heading 3811, a
use provision, was more specific than heading 3902, an eo nomine
47
provision, which described the product by name, not use.
Therefore, the court concluded that the CIT’s classification was
correct because the imported product was prima facie classifiable in
heading 3811 and because heading 3811 was more specific than
heading 3902. This, coupled with the Explanatory Notes to Chapter

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 497 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
42. See id. at 1311 (determining that the CIT was correct “[b]ecause the imported
product is prima facie classifiable in heading 3811 of the HTSUS, and because
heading 3811 is more specific than the heading in which BASF argues the product
should be classified”).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1312; see id. (explaining BASF’s arguments that (1) the imported
product is mixed with other chemicals before being added to gasoline and is thus
not a “prepared additive for gasoline” falling under heading 3811, and (2) heading
3902 more specifically captures the true character of the product).
45. Id. at 1314–15.
46. Id. at 1314.
47. See id. at 1315 (explaining the court’s decision to follow the general rule that
use provisions are more specific than eo nomine provisions, as well as the court’s
application of the Explanatory Note corresponding to Chapter 39 of the HTSUS to
support its decision).
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48

39, compelled the Federal Circuit to affirm the CIT’s determination
49
that the imported product should be classified in heading 3811.
50
Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc. v. United States involved the appeal by
Customs of a CIT decision reclassifying 105 models of imported light
51
fixtures.
The case originally involved the classification of 124
models of light fixtures imported by Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc.
(“Home Depot”), which Customs classified under HTSUS
subheading 9405.10.80 as light fixtures made of a base metal other
52
than brass, subject to a 7.6% duty. Home Depot argued that these
imports were better classified under subheading 9405.10.80, as light
fixtures made of something other than base metal, and should thus
53
be subject to only a 3.9% duty. The Federal Circuit affirmed the
CIT’s decision, agreeing with Home Depot and reclassifying the light
54
fixtures under 9405.10.80.
While both parties agreed that the proper first-level subheading for
the subject goods is 9405.10, they disputed which of the two potential
55
second-level subheadings covered the light fixtures. In its analysis,
the Federal Circuit applied the GRI provisions in numerical order,
starting with GRI 2(b). Under GRI 2(b), because the light fixtures at
issue consisted of more than one material or substance, the
classifications of the goods were to be determined according to the
56
principles of GRI 3.
Applying GRI 3(a), the Federal Circuit
determined that “[t]he two subheadings at issue ‘each refer to part
only of the materials’ contained in the subject goods, so they must be
57
‘regarded as equally specific’ pursuant to GRI 3(a).”
The Federal Circuit then turned to GRI 3(b), “which instructs that
the goods should be classified as if they consisted of the material or
58
component which gives them their essential character.”
The
48. “When as a result of the addition of certain substances, the resultant products
answer to the description in a more specific heading elsewhere . . . they are excluded
from Chapter 39.” OFFICE OF TARIFF AFFAIRS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS, HARMONIZED
TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES, Chapter 39, Explanatory Notes 718 (3d ed.
2002).
49. BASF Corp., 497 F.3d at 1316.
50. 491 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
51. Id. at 1335.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1336.
56. Id.
57. Id. (quoting OFFICE OF TARIFF AFFAIRS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS, HARMONIZED
TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES, General Rule of Interpretation 3(a) (3d ed.
2002)).
58. Id. (quoting OFFICE OF TARIFF AFFAIRS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS, HARMONIZED
TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES, General Rule of Interpretation 3(a) (2007)).
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essential character test is a fact-intensive analysis. Customs argued
that a light fixture’s essential character is derived from the material
that forms its structural framework. The Federal Circuit rejected that
argument, holding that under the essential character test’s factintensive analysis, many factors should be considered when
determining the essential character of a light fixture, including but
not limited to those factors enumerated in Explanatory Note VIII to
59
GRI 3(b). Thus, the Federal Circuit found no clear error in the
CIT’s factual analysis, and affirmed the CIT’s determinations to
60
reclassify the light fixtures under subheading 9405.10.80.
61
In Michael Simon Design, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
addressed the classification of apparel items that the importer,
Michael Simon Design, Inc. (“MSD”), claimed were properly
classified as duty free “festive articles” under chapter 95 of the
62
HTSUS. The CIT granted summary judgment in favor of MSD on
several styles, holding they were “festive articles” properly classified
63
under chapter 95. The government appealed the grant of summary
judgment to the Federal Circuit, arguing that the articles were
properly classified under chapters 61 or 62, which cover sports
64
clothing and dress shirts and do impose a duty. The Federal Circuit
65
affirmed the CIT’s determination.
In its analysis, the Federal Circuit again held that utilitarian articles
66
can be classified as festive articles under heading 9505. The Federal
Circuit found that “the tariff heading unambiguously includes festive
apparel when construed in light of the section and chapter notes,

59. Id. at 1336–37 (“The factor which determines essential character will vary as
between different kinds of goods . . . [and] may . . . be determined by the nature of
the material or component, its bulk, quantity, weight or value, or by the role of a
constituent material in relation to the use of the goods.” (quoting OFFICE OF TARIFF
AFFAIRS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS, HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED
STATES, General Rule of Interpretation 3(b), Explanatory Note VIII (2007)).
60. Id. at 1337.
61. 501 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
62. Id. at 1305.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1307.
66. Id. at 1305–06. The court rejected the government’s argument that
utilitarian articles are not classifiable as festive articles under heading 9505, citing the
court’s similar decisions in Midwest of Cannon Falls, Inc. v. United States, 122 F.3d 1423,
1429 (Fed. Cir. 1997), where the Federal Circuit held that “[n]othing from the
pertinent subheading 9505.90.60—‘other festive, carnival or other entertainment
articles’—limits 9505.90.60 to only ‘non-utilitarian’ items,” and Park B. Smith, Ltd. v.
United States, 347 F.3d 922, 929 (Fed. Cir. 2003), where the Federal Circuit classified
napkins, placemats, and rugs bearing Halloween and Christmas symbols as festive
articles, finding that their utilitarian functions did not preclude them from
classification therein. Id.
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67

which are binding.” Additionally, a legal note to section XI of the
HTSUS, which covers chapters 61 and 62, clarifies that the section
68
does not cover articles of chapter 95. The Federal Circuit noted
that this was evidence that “the tariff scheme contemplates articles
falling into both apparel and festive article categories, and [that] it
expressly resolve[d] this conflict in favor of classification in chapter
69
95.”
Lastly, the government argued that an amendment to the
Explanatory Notes expressly excluded articles having a utilitarian
70
function from classification as a festive article. However, the Federal
Circuit noted that the Explanatory Notes are not binding, but are
71
merely interpretive guides. The Federal Circuit cited Rubie’s Costume
72
Co. v. United States for the proposition that, “although the examples
in the Explanatory Notes are probative and sometimes illuminating,”
the court did not have to “employ their limiting characteristics . . . to
73
narrow the language of the classification heading itself.” Therefore,
in light of the unambiguous tariff heading, the Federal Circuit
74
determined not to afford the Explanatory Notes any weight. Thus,
the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s determination to classify the
75
articles under chapter 95.
76
Degussa Corp. v. United States involved the classification of certain
surface-modified silicon dioxide imported by Degussa Corporation
77
(“Degussa”).
The silicon dioxide at issue had been treated with
hydrocarbon moieties, which caused the natural, unmodified
hydrophilic (water-attractive) silica to become hydrophobic (water78
repellant). The government appealed the CIT’s classification of the
imported silicon dioxide under subheading 2811.22.50 of the
HTSUS, which provides for “Silicon dioxide: Other” and applies no
79
duty. On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the CIT, finding that
Degussa’s products contained certain impermissible impurities that
precluded classification under heading 2811, and the court classified
67. Id. at 1306.
68. See id. (citing OFFICE OF TARIFF AFFAIRS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS, HARMONIZED
TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES, Section XI, Note 1(t) (2007)).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1307.
71. Id.
72. 337 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
73. Michael Simon Design, 501 F.3d at 1307 (quoting Rubie’s Costume Co., 337 F.3d
at 1359).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 508 F.3d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
77. Id. at 1045.
78. Id. at 1046.
79. Id. at 1047.
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the products under Chapter 38, which covers goods of
80
“Miscellaneous chemical industries.”
The Federal Circuit determined that silicon dioxide with added
hydrocarbons for the express purpose of making the surface
hydrophobic contained impermissible impurities and could not be
81
The Federal Circuit
classified under chapter 28 of the HTSUS.
relied on chapter 28, Note 1(a) of the HTSUS, which provides:
“except where context otherwise requires, the headings of this
chapter apply only to: (a) Separate chemical elements and separate
chemical defined compounds, whether or not containing
82
impurities.” The Explanatory Note stated that “products with added
water-repellants are . . . excluded from Chapter 28 because such
83
agents modify the original characteristics of the products.” Thus,
the Federal Circuit determined that Degussa’s surface-treated silicon
dioxide contained impermissible impurities (water-repellants) and
84
were not properly classified under Chapter 28. The Federal Circuit
reversed the CIT and held that Customs had properly classified the
surface modified silica products under subheading 3824.90.80
covering “chemical products and preparations of the chemical and
85
allied industries.”
86
Motorola, Inc. v. United States was brought before the Federal
Circuit again when Motorola, Inc. (“Motorola”) contested the CIT’s
remand determination on the classification of various circuits
87
imported by Motorola for use in cellular phone battery packs. This
time, the Federal Circuit addressed whether goods entered by the
bypass procedure, meaning that they were not inspected by Customs
for a determination of the proper HTSUS classification, qualified as
“treatment” under 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c), such that any changes to the
88
classification would require notice and comment procedures.

80. Id. at 1045–46.
81. Id. at 1050–51.
82. Id. at 1049 (citing OFFICE OF TARIFF AFFAIRS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS,
HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES, Chapter 28, General Note 1(a)
(2007)). Chapter notes are part of the statutory text of the HTSUS and, therefore,
are legally binding. Id. at 1047. While Explanatory Notes are generally non-binding,
they may be consulted for guidance and are generally indicative of the proper
interpretation of tariff provisions. Id.
83. Id. at 1048 (citing OFFICE OF TARIFF AFFAIRS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS,
HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES, Chapter 28, General Note 1(a),
Explanatory Note) (2007).
84. Id. at 1050.
85. Id. at 1051.
86. 509 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
87. Id. at 1369.
88. Id. at 1370–71.
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Customs had issued pre-classification ruling letters (“PRLs”)
classifying certain circuits previously imported by Motorola under a
duty-free HTSUS provision, subheading 8542.40.00. Several years
later, Motorola imported other circuit models, and Customs
liquidated them without inspection under the same PRL subheading.
Motorola filed some 900 entries under this procedure. Customs later
reclassified these circuits under a different subheading that imposed
a 3.2% duty. The CIT determined that the goods imported pursuant
to the PRLs were not “treated” for the purposes of § 1625(c), so
Customs’ reclassification was proper, even without prior notice and
89
Motorola appealed this
an opportunity for comment.
determination, and the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s
90
determination.
The Federal Circuit found that Motorola could not satisfy all of the
91
requirements set forth in 19 C.F.R. § 177.12(c), under which
92
importers may claim “treatment” as set forth in § 1625(c)(2). The
Federal Circuit found that the 900 entries that Motorola cited could
not satisfy subsection (c) because there were never any actual
examinations or determinations that any of those transactions
93
qualified for inclusion under schedule 8542.40.00 of the HTSUS.
Further, the Federal Circuit rejected Motorola’s argument that the
94
PRLs alone satisfy subsection (c). Noting that the PRLs are prior
interpretive rulings that bind Customs only with respect to the items
identified in the PRLs and not any other merchandise, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the CIT’s determination that Customs did not violate
section 1625(c) in classifying the entries under subheading
95
8536.30.80 of the HTSUS.
89. Id. at 1371.
90. Id. at 1372.
91. 19 C.F.R. § 177.12(c) provides that:
(i) There must be evidence to establish that:
(A) There was an actual determination by a Customs officer regarding
the facts and issues involved in the claimed treatment;
(B) The Customs officer making the actual determination was
responsible for the subject matter on which the determination was
made; and
(C) Over a 2-year period immediately preceding the claim of treatment,
Customs consistently applied that determination on a national basis as
reflected in liquidations of entries or reconciliations or other Customs
actions with respect to all or substantially all of that person’s Customs
transactions involving materially identical facts and issues . . . .
19 C.F.R. § 177.12(c) (2002), cited in Motorola, 509 F.3d at 1371.
92. Motorola, 509 F.3d at 1372 (citations omitted).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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Although classification decisions typically are only of interest for
importers of goods identical, or at least similar, to those at issue in
the decided cases, occasionally a decision of the Federal Circuit
provides guidance on general principles of HTSUS classification. For
example, in 2007, in Degussa, Home Depot, and Optrex, the court
suggested the potential importance of the Explanatory Notes,
particularly in instances where they elucidate the meaning of HTSUS
96
legal notes or tariff provisions. In Michael Simon Design, on the other
hand, the Federal Circuit noted that it is not bound by the language
97
of the Explanatory Notes. In Motorola, the court demonstrated that
Customs’ interpretive regulations can be used to determine whether
98
Customs has complied with 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c).
B. Drawback Claims
Two Federal Circuit opinions in 2007 addressed claims for
drawback. Drawback is defined as “the refund or remission, in whole
or in part, of a customs duty, fee or internal revenue tax which was
imposed on imported merchandise under Federal law because of its
99
importation.”
100
In Merck & Co. v. United States, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
CIT’s determination that 19 U.S.C. § 1313(j)(4)(A) prohibited
drawback for substituted merchandise exported to a NAFTA country
unless the imported merchandise was of the type listed in 19 U.S.C.
101
This case involved Merck’s importation of thirty-five
§ 3333(a).
102
kilograms of famotidine to the United States from Ireland, at a duty
103
rate of 6.9% ad valorem, on May 25, 1993.
Two years later, Merck
imported an additional 1195 kilograms of famotidine, duty free,

96. See Degussa Corp. v. United States, 508 F.3d 1044, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(finding that the Explanatory Notes provided insight into the meaning of a term
important to the analysis of the case); Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 491
F.3d 1334, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (applying a test set forth in the Explanatory
Notes); Optrex America, Inc. v. United States, 475 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(asserting that the Explanatory Notes inform the court’s analysis).
97. Michael Simon Design, Inc. v. United States, 501 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
98. See 509 F.3d at 1371–72 (deferring to Customs’ interpretation of its
regulation, 19 C.F.R. § 177.12(c) (2002), in Customs’ determination of whether it
had complied with the requirements of 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c) (2000)).
99. Merck & Co. v. United States, 499 F.3d 1348, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting
19 C.F.R. § 191.2(i) (2002)).
100. 499 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
101. Id. at 1353.
102. See id. at 1351 n.2 (“Famotidine chemical is formulated into famotidine
tablets and is marketed under the trademark PEPCID.”).
103. Id. at 1351.
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Around that
pursuant to the Uruguay Round Trade Agreement.
same time, Merck exported thirty-five kilograms of duty-free
105
Merck filed a claim
imported famotidine to Mexico and Canada.
for drawback seeking a refund of the duties paid for the thirty-five
106
kilograms of famotidine imported in 1993.
It alleged that the
exported merchandise was fungible with, and substituted for, the
duty-paid imported merchandise, entitling Merck to drawback under
107
§ 1313(j)(2).
Customs denied the drawback, “reasoning that
108
generally prohibits drawback for merchandise
§ 1313(j)(4)(A)
fungible with, and substituted for, the duty-paid imported
merchandise when that merchandise is exported to a NAFTA
109
Merck filed suit
country, unless it is of the type listed in § 3333.”
and sought reversal, asserting that the exported merchandise met
one of the exceptions in § 3333(a), as a “good exported to a NAFTA
110
country in the same condition as when imported.” The CIT agreed
with the government’s argument that, because the imported dutypaid merchandise itself was not subsequently exported, it could not
qualify as a “good exported to a NAFTA country in the same
condition as when imported,” under § 3333(a)(2), and therefore was
111
subject to the NAFTA drawback restriction in § 1313(j)(4)(A).
Both the CIT and Federal Circuit noted that the statute was
ambiguous on its face, and therefore required consideration of
various sources, including the legislative history, the regulations, and
United States Customs Headquarters (“Customs HQ”) rulings, to
112
ascertain Congress’ intent.
“According to Merck, under the plain
language of § 1313(j)(4)(A), the exceptions of § 3333(a) apply to the
substituted exported merchandise, not to the duty-paid imported
113
The government, on the other hand, contended
merchandise.”
that the imported merchandise had to be of the type listed in § 3333(a)
114
The government argued that,
for drawback to be permitted.
because the duty-paid imported merchandise did not meet any of the
115
exceptions in § 3333(a), § 1313(j)(4)(A) prohibited drawback.
104. Id. at 1351; see id. at n.3 (“Under the Uruguay Round Trade Agreement,
tariffs on pharmaceutical products were eliminated, effective January 1, 1995.”).
105. Id. at 1352.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1352.
109. Id. at 1351.
110. Id. at 1351–52.
111. Id. at 1352.
112. Id. at 1354–55.
113. Id. at 1353 (emphasis added).
114. Id.
115. Id.
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The Federal Circuit found that the legislative history made it clear
that Congress enacted § 1313(j)(4)(A) in order to eliminate nearly
116
all drawback for substituted goods exported to a NAFTA country.
The relevant NAFTA provision itself also made it clear that drawback
117
on substituted merchandise was to be eliminated.
Therefore, the
court determined that permitting drawback for Merck’s exported
118
merchandise would be contrary to the clear intent of Congress.
119
120
Further, Customs regulations and Customs HQ rulings supported
this conclusion. In particular, 19 C.F.R. § 181.41 and 19 C.F.R.
§ 181.42 restricted or prohibited certain drawback on goods exported
121
to Canada or Mexico on or after January 1, 1994.
Customs HQ
122
The Federal
rulings were also consistent with these findings.
Circuit therefore affirmed the CIT’s finding that the government’s
interpretation of section 1313(j)(4)(A) was supported by the
123
legislative history, Customs regulations, and Customs HQ rulings.

116. Id. at 1355.
117. Id. (citing North Am. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 3, Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 2 (1993)).
118. See id. (characterizing Merck’s attempt at obtaining drawback as “precisely
the type of situation where Congress clearly intended to preclude drawback”).
119. In particular, the court relied on 19 C.F.R. § 181.41 and 19 C.F.R. § 181.42, as
these regulations restricted or prohibited certain drawback on goods exported to
Canada or Mexico on or after January 1, 1994. Id. at 1356. 19 C.F.R. § 181.41
provides: “Subpart E. Restrictions on Drawback and Duty-Deferral Programs. This
subpart sets forth the provisions regarding drawback claims and duty-deferral
programs under Article 303 of the NAFTA and applies to any good that is a ‘good
subject to NAFTA drawback’ within the meaning of 19 U.S.C. 3333.” 19 C.F.R.
§ 181.41 (2007). 19 C.F.R. § 181.42 provides:
The following duties or fees which may be applicable to a good entered for
consumption in the Customs territory of the United States are not subject to
drawback under this subpart: . . .
(d) Customs duties paid or owed under unused merchandise
substitution drawback. There shall be no payment of such drawback
under 19 U.S.C. 1313(j)(2) on goods exported to Canada or Mexico on
or after January 1, 1994.
19 C.F.R. § 181.42 (2008).
120. The court cited one such ruling, Customs HQ Ruling No. 228209, where
Customs considered the same issue and stated that “[w]e do not agree that the
limitation in § 1313(j)(4) applies to the substituted merchandise which is not the
basis of the drawback claim, but find that the limitation applies to the imported good
which is the basis of the drawback claim.” Merck, 499 F.3d at 1356 (citing U.S.
Customs & Border Protection, Customs Headquarters Ruling No. 228209 (Apr. 12,
2002)). Customs has taken similar positions in prior decisions. See, e.g., id. (citing
U.S. Customs & Border Protection, Customs Headquarters Ruling No. 227272 (May
1, 1997); U.S. Customs & Border Protection, Customs Headquarters Ruling No.
227876 (Aug. 21, 2000); U.S. Customs & Border Protection, Customs Headquarters
Ruling No. 226541 (July 24, 1998)).
121. See supra note 119 (quoting from 19 C.F.R. § 181.41 and 19 C.F.R. § 181.42).
122. See supra note 120 (reviewing Customs Headquarters rulings).
123. Merck, 499 F.3d at 1357.
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124

In Graham Engineering Corp. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
faced the issue of whether a Customs regulation requiring a party to
give notice of intent to export prior to the filing of a drawback claim
125
In October of 2000, Graham Engineering Corp.
was valid.
(“Graham”) exported a blow molding machine that it had imported a
126
Graham sought “unused merchandise
few months earlier.
drawback” pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1313(j)(1), which “provides for a
ninety-nine percent refund of duty paid if the imported merchandise
upon which duty has been paid is exported within three years from
127
entry without use in the United States before exportation.”
However, Customs denied its claim for drawback because Graham
failed to provide notice of intent to export merchandise, as is
128
required by 19 C.F.R. § 191.35(a).
The sole issue before the court was whether Customs’ notice of
129
intent to export regulation is valid. The CIT held that “the notice
of intent to export regulation is based on statutory authority and
130
therefore not unlawful on its face.” The CIT relied on United States
131
v. Lockheed Petroleum Services, Inc., which stated that drawback
privileges “are expressly conditioned, by statute, upon compliance
with such rules and regulations as the Secretary of Treasury shall
132
The CIT further found that the regulation was
prescribe.”
reasonable and not unduly burdensome because the notice of intent
to export required only certification of lack of use in the United
States, information regarding importation and intended exportation,
133
contact information, and the location of the merchandise.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s determination, recognizing
134
that the rulemaking authority vested in Customs by § 1313(l)
explicitly conditions the benefits of § 1313 on compliance with

124. 510 F.3d 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
125. Id. at 1387.
126. Id. at 1386.
127. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1313(j)(1) (2000)).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1388.
131. 709 F.2d 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
132. Id. at 1474.
133. Graham, 510 F.3d at 1388 (applying 19 C.F.R. § 191.35(b) (1998)).
134. This provision states:
Allowance of the privileges provided for in this section shall be subject to
compliance with such rules and regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury
shall prescribe, which may include, but need not be limited to, the authority
for the electronic submission of drawback entries and the designation of the
person to whom any refund or payment of drawback shall be made.
19 U.S.C. § 1313(l) (2000).
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135

The Federal Circuit
regulations Customs might prescribe.
determined that the notice of intent to export is “reasonably related
136
Therefore, Customs acted within its
to the statute it serves.”
statutory powers to promulgate and enforce its notice of intent to
137
export regulation.
Because the regulation was not satisfied by
Graham, the Federal Circuit held that Customs properly rejected its
138
drawback claim.
The Merck decision demonstrates that, where the drawback statute
or its related statutes are ambiguous, the Federal Circuit will use
legislative history, as well as Customs’ interpretive regulations and
139
rulings, to determine the meaning of the statutory language. The
Graham decision shows that, where Congress has clearly delegated
authority to Customs to promulgate interpretive regulations, those
140
regulations are enforceable.
C. Jurisdictional Issues
The Federal Circuit decided one case in 2007 that addressed
whether the CIT had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581(i). The court also decided another case in 2007 that
addressed the timeliness of filing protests.
In a non-precedential opinion, International Custom Products, Inc. v.
141
United States (Int’l Custom Prods. II), International Custom Products,
Inc. (“ICP”) appealed the CIT’s dismissal of one count of its
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) for lack of subject matter
142
ICP was an importer and distributor of a milk-fat
jurisdiction.
based product that was used as an ingredient in sauces, salad
143
dressings, dips, and other food products.
Prior to importing its
product, ICP received an advance ruling letter from Customs that
135. Graham, 510 F.3d at 1389.
136. See id. (relying on Mourning v. Family Publications Service., Inc., 411 U.S. 356,
369 (1973), where the Supreme Court held that “when Congress provides express
rulemaking authority to an agency in order to carry out the substantive provisions of
a statute, a regulation promulgated under such authority is valid, so long as the
regulation is ‘reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation.’”).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Merck & Co. v. United States, 499 F.3d 1348, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(providing that, because the statutory scheme was a “confusing and inconsistent
maze of twists and turns,” the court would consider sources such as legislative history,
the regulations, and Headquarters Rulings to determine Congress’s intent).
140. See Graham, 510 F.3d at 1389 (determining that Customs’ regulation here was
valid, as it was reasonably related to the purposes of the statute, and therefore was
enforceable).
141. 214 F. App’x 993 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
142. Id. at 993.
143. Id. at 994.
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ICP
classified ICP’s product under subheading 2103.90.9091.
began importation of its product in April 1999, and continued until
April 2005, when Customs issued a Notice of Action informing ICP
that Customs was reclassifying ICP’s product under subheading
145
On May 6, 2005,
0405.20.3000 of the HTSUS as a “dairy spread.”
ICP commenced its first action in the CIT challenging the Notice of
146
Action.
While the CIT found in favor of ICP, the Federal Circuit
reversed the CIT’s holding of jurisdiction, vacated the judgment, and
147
remanded for dismissal of the complaint. The Federal Circuit held
that “the remedy provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) was not manifestly
inadequate, and, accordingly, the CIT lacked jurisdiction under
148
§ 1581(i) to determine the validity of the Notice of Action.”
In the time between the government’s notice of appeal and the
Federal Circuit’s decision, Customs published a Proposed Revocation
notice in August 2005, and later a Revocation letter on November 2,
2005, reclassifying ICP’s product as a “dairy spread” under
149
On November 14, 2005,
subheading 0405.20.3000 of the HTSUS.
ICP brought another action in the CIT challenging Customs’
classification, and argued that the CIT had jurisdiction pursuant to
150
28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). The CIT dismissed the complaint, finding that
it did not have subject matter jurisdiction because ICP failed to
exhaust its protest administrative remedies under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1514
151
and 1515 prior to filing with the CIT.
152
The Federal Circuit addressed two arguments
in deciding
whether § 1581(a) jurisdiction was manifestly inadequate:
(1) whether “§ 1581(a) jurisdiction ‘fundamentally alters the legal
framework of the adjudication’” by requiring de novo review of the

144. See id. (noting that ICP’s product was classified as “white sauce”).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. (citing Int’l Custom Prods. v. United States (Int’l Custom Prods. I), 467 F.3d
1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
148. Id. (citing Int’l Custom Prods. I, 467 F.3d at 1327); see id. at 995 (explaining
that “jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) may not be invoked unless jurisdiction
under another subsection of § 1581 is either unavailable or manifestly inadequate”).
149. Id.
150. See id. at 994–95 (challenging the government’s motion to dismiss all counts
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
151. Id. at 995 (again citing the proposition that § 1581(i) jurisdiction exists only
when jurisdiction under another subsection of the provision is “unavailable or
manifestly inadequate”).
152. Id. While ICP presented five arguments as to why § 1581(a) jurisdiction is
manifestly inadequate, the Federal Circuit did not address the other three because
they were rejected for the same reasons stated in the Court’s earlier opinion. Id. For
the court’s reasoning in its earlier opinion, see International Custom Products I, 467
F.3d at 1327–28.
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153

CIT classification rather than review of the administrative record;
and (2) whether “§ 1581(a) jurisdiction is incapable of holding
Customs accountable for its failure to comply with the notice and
154
comment process mandated by 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c).” In addressing
the first argument, the Federal Circuit noted that ICP could not
prevail on a challenge of the administrative decision, anyway, because
it “failed to file a protest of Customs’ actions and avail itself of
155
jurisdiction under § 1581(a).” Secondly, the Federal Circuit found
that § 1581(a) was an adequate remedy, and, even if it was not,
jurisdiction under § 1581(h) would be the only remedy available to
challenge the validity of Customs’ Notice of Action without requiring
156
Finally, the Court rejected ICP’s
prior importation of goods.
challenge that the protest and review scheme contemplated by
§ 1581(a) was unavailable because the company had not imported
157
any product prior to, or after, the filing of its action. Because ICP
did not attempt to import any shipments and then file a protest, the
Federal Circuit found that ICP could not “manufacture jurisdiction
158
under § 1581(i) by willfully avoiding the prerequisites of § 1581(a).”
159
Samuel Aaron, Inc. v. United States involved the reliquidation of
entries made by Samuel Aaron, Inc. (“Samuel Aaron”), an importer
160
Under the Generalized System of
of jewelry from Thailand.
Preferences (“GSP”) program, certain imports from Thailand and
161
other developing countries were eligible for a free rate of duty.
However, the GSP expired, and during the period of time before its
reinstatement, Samuel Aaron imported and paid duties on its
162
imports.
While Congress granted retroactive refunds for certain
items that had been imported during the lapse of the GSP, Samuel
Aaron’s imports were found ineligible for the retroactive refunds
163
provided for by statute. Customs determined that a reliquidation of
all refunds was necessary for certain imports from Thailand,
164
including Samuel Aaron’s entries.
Customs placed a notice of
liquidation in its “off-line bulletin” on February 8, 1999, at the
153. Int’l Custom Prods. v. United States (Int’l Custom Prods. II), 214 F. App’x 933,
955 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 995–96.
156. Id. at 996.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. 508 F.3d 667 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
160. Id. at 667–70.
161. Id. at 668.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 669.
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165

Customs later placed a
customhouse in the Port of New York.
bulletin notice created by its automated system on file on April 30,
1999, to notify interested parties about the reliquidation of Samuel
166
Aaron’s imports. However, Samuel Aaron did not file its protest to
dispute the increased duties until July 29, 1999, more than ninety
167
Customs, therefore, denied
days after the date of reliquidation.
168
Samuel Aaron’s protest as untimely. The CIT dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, finding that a final computation of duties had occurred
on February 8, 1999, the bulletin notice was legally sufficient, and
thus there had been a valid reliquidation of Samuel Aaron’s entries
169
on February 8, 1999.
The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that Samuel Aaron’s protest
of Customs’ February 8, 1999 reliquidation was untimely, and that the
170
CIT lacked jurisdiction to hear the complaint.
In particular, the
171
Federal Circuit determined that Customs did, in fact, liquidate on
172
February 8, 1999, in compliance with 19 C.F.R. § 159.1.
Further,
the Federal Circuit found that the reliquidation notice requirements
173
were met by Customs’ off-line bulletin notice in the customhouse.
Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1500(e), Customs must give notice of any
174
liquidation to an importer as prescribed by regulation. The Federal
Circuit determined that the notice was in a conspicuous place, in
compliance with 19 C.F.R. § 159.9(b), and adequate as evaluated
according to the standard of a prudent importer or other interested
175
person exercising a reasonable amount of diligence. Furthermore,
it found that Customs’ failure to file the notice on the correct form
did not invalidate the filing, as the substance of the information
provided in the off-line bulletin notice was sufficient to meet the
176
requirements of 19 C.F.R. § 159.9(a). Finally, the Court concluded

165. See id. (explaining that the notice was considered “off-line” because it was not
generated by the Customs’ automated system, which generates the vast majority of
bulletin notices).
166. Id.
167. Id. The statutory limitations period for protests in 1999 was ninety days.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 674.
171. Liquidation is the “final computation or ascertainment of the duties . . .
accruing on an entry.” Id. at 670–71 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 159.1 (2007)).
172. Id. at 670–72.
173. Id. at 674.
174. Id. at 672 (citation omitted).
175. See id. at 672–73 (citing the “conspicuous place” standard set forth in Frederick
Wholesale Co. v. United States, 754 F.2d 349, 352 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
176. See id. at 673 (providing that all of the vital information was present on the
form filed by Customs, and that “[f]ormality need not prevail over substance”).
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that, while § 1500(e) gives Customs the option of notifying importers
177
of liquidations electronically, it does not require it.
The International Custom Products opinion is another in a long line
of decisions circumscribing the CIT’s jurisdiction under the residual
178
jurisdiction provision, 19 U.S.C. § 1581(i).
If there is an
opportunity for the importer to obtain jurisdiction of the CIT by
importing a good and protesting its classification, the courts will not
179
find jurisdiction pursuant to that provision.
Similarly, the Samuel Aaron decision is another in a long line of
decisions emphasizing the importance of filing protests in a timely
180
manner.
Such decisions continue to support the necessity for
importers to monitor Customs’ posting of bulletin notices of
liquidation.
D. Other Customs Issues
181

Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. United States involved the authority of
Customs to alter tariff rates for merchandise properly classified under
182
the HTSUS.
Forest Laboratories, Inc. (“Forest”) imported a
183
pharmaceutical product, hydroxypropyl methylcellulose (“HPMC”).
Customs issued a ruling letter on March 17, 1999, in which Customs
and Forest both agreed that the HPMC was properly classified under
184
subheading 3912.39.00 of the HTSUS. However, while Forest stated
that the duty rate was 4.2% ad valorem, Customs stated in its ruling
185
letter that the HPMC was duty free as a pharmaceutical product.
“HPMC was listed in the Pharmaceutical Appendix until 1997 when it
186
was removed by Presidential proclamation.”
Forest acknowledged

177. See id. at 674 (reasoning that Customs is given the option to either give notice
in a manner prescribed by the Secretary or to give notice electronically).
178. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (explaining that the Federal
Circuit has found that the ICP cannot manufacture jurisdiction under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1581(i)).
179. Id.
180. Samuel Aaron, 508 F.3d at 672.
181. 476 F.3d 877 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
182. Id. at 878.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 879.
185. Id. Customs cited General Note 13 of the HTSUS, which provides in part:
Pharmaceutical Products. Whenever a rate of duty of “Free” followed by the
symbol “K” in parenthesis appears in the “Special” subcolumn for a heading
or subheading, any product (by whatever name known) classifiable in such
provision which is the product of a country eligible for tariff treatment under
column 1 shall be entered free of duty, provided that such product is included in
the pharmaceutical appendix to the tariff schedule.
Id. (emphasis added).
186. Id.
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that HPMC is not listed in the Pharmaceutical Appendix to the tariff
187
schedule and was not listed at the time it imported HPMC.
“Rather, Forest attempted to assert that Customs’ statement in [the
ruling letter] that Forest’s HPMC qualified for duty free
treatment . . . was binding on Customs and could not be revoked or
modified without following the notice and comment requirements in
188
19 U.S.C. § 1625(c).”
Customs denied Forest’s duty assessment
protest because HPMC was not listed in the Pharmaceutical
Appendix as required by General Note 13 of the HTSUS, and
189
therefore was not entitled to duty-free treatment.
The central issue before the Federal Circuit was “whether Customs
ha[d] the legal authority to change the HTSUS tariff duty for
190
otherwise properly classified merchandise under HTSUS.”
In its
analysis, the Federal Circuit found that a requirement of General
Note 13, which permits duty-free treatment of certain pharmaceutical
products, was not met, as HPMC was not listed in the Pharmaceutical
191
Additionally, the Federal Circuit determined that
Appendix.
Customs did not have the authority to change the duty rates set by
Congress under the tariff statute, and therefore could not act outside
of its statutory authority by permitting duty-free treatment through its
192
issuance of N.Y. D88210. The HPMC was thus properly liquidated
at the duty rate of 4.2% ad valorem as set forth in subheading
193
3912.39.00 of the HTSUS.
194
In United States v. National Semiconductor Corp., the Federal Circuit
held that the CIT reached beyond the penalty provision § 1592(c)(4)
in awarding compensatory interest, and thereby vacated and
195
The CIT awarded compensatory
remanded the case to the court.
interest in the amount of $250,840.21 under 19 U.S.C. § 1505(c) and
a penalty award in the amount of $10,000 under 19 U.S.C.
196
This case arose out of National Semiconductor
§ 1592(c)(4).
Corporation’s (“NSC”) discovery that it had undervalued certain
integrated circuits, micro-assemblies, and parts thereof, resulting in

187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 880.
190. Id. at 881–82.
191. See id. (concluding that because HPMC was not listed in the Pharmaceutical
Appendix, the product was not eligible for duty-free treatment under General Note
13).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. 496 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
195. Id. at 1355.
196. Id. at 1356.
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197

two groups of erroneous customs entries. NSC voluntarily disclosed
198
Customs accepted the
the errors and tendered the unpaid fees.
tender but determined that negligent violations of 19 U.S.C.
199
§ 1592(a) allowed it to assess penalties. Customs assessed penalties
200
NSC
in the amount of $250,840.21 for both negligent entries.
protested, stating that, while it had been negligent, it should not be
assessed the maximum penalty because it had acted responsibly by
201
voluntarily reporting the erroneous entries.
NSC filed an action at the CIT, which considered the fourteen
202
factors, set forth in United States v. Complex Machine Works Co., that
the CIT may consider when determining the appropriateness of a
203
The CIT concluded
civil penalty for a violation of customs laws.
that the maximum allowable penalty under § 1592(c)(4) would not
204
fully compensate the government. The CIT therefore determined
that the government was entitled to an award of $10,000 as a penalty
205
under § 1592(c)(4) and compensatory interest under § 1505(c).
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, NSC argued that the CIT abused
its discretion in awarding non-penal compensatory interest, arguing
that the only recovery available to the government was the penalty of
206
$10,000 that was awarded under § 1592(c)(4). The Federal Circuit
held that the CIT erred in awarding compensatory interest to the
207
government under § 1505(c). Under § 1592, where an importer’s
violation is due to negligence and the importer voluntarily discloses
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. 23 Ct. Int’l Trade 942 (1999).
203. The Complex Machine Works analysis includes fourteen factors:
(1) [T]he defendant’s good faith effort to comply with the statute; (2) the
degree of culpability involved; (3) the defendant’s history of previous
violations; (4) the nature of the public interest in ensuring compliance with
the applicable law; (5) the nature and circumstances of the violation; (6) the
gravity of the violation; (7) the defendant’s ability to pay; (8) the
appropriateness of the size of the penalty vis-à-vis the defendant’s business
and the effect of the penalty on the defendant’s ability to continue doing
business; (9) the economic benefit gained by the defendant through the
violation; (10) whether the party sought to be protected by the statute is
elsewhere adequately compensated for the harm; (11) the degree of harm to
the public; (12) the value of vindicating agency authority; (13) whether the
penalty shocks the conscience of the court; and (14) such other matters as
justice may require.
Id. at 949–50.
204. National Semiconductor, 496 F.3d at 1357.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1359.
207. Id.
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the violation to Customs, the amount of the penalty cannot exceed
208
This
the interest on the amount of lawful duties, taxes, and fees.
language unambiguously capped the amount the government may
recover. Nothing in the statutory language provides for recovery of
non-penal compensatory interest in an action to collect an interest
209
Furthermore, § 1505 requires
penalty pursuant to § 1592(c).
liquidation or reliquidation of an entry at a higher rate of duty, fee,
or tax for the government to recover compensatory interest under
210
§ 1505(c). In this case, it was undisputed that more than one year
had passed from the date of NSC’s erroneous entries to the date
211
when NSC notified Customs of the error.
Therefore, the entries
had already been liquidated and were final as a matter of law and
there could be no accrual of interest on the unpaid merchandise
212
processing fees.
In light of this, the CIT’s award of compensatory
213
The Federal
interest under 19 U.S.C. § 1505(c) was in error.
Circuit vacated the judgment of the CIT and remanded the case to
the CIT to conduct a Complex Machine Works analysis solely under
214
§ 1592(c)(4).
215
In United States v. Ford Motor Co., the Federal Circuit faced issues
of waiver and issue preclusion. The case was part of a long line of
cases involving Ford Motor Company’s (“Ford”) alleged
misrepresentations of motor vehicle engine and transmission import

208. 19 U.S.C. § 1592(c)(4)(B) (2000) provides:
[I]f the person concerned discloses the circumstances of a violation of
subsection (a) of this section before, or without knowledge of, the
commencement of a formal investigation of such violation, with respect to
such violation, merchandise shall not be seized and any monetary penalty to
be assessed under subsection (c) of this section shall not exceed, if such
violation resulted from negligence or gross negligence, the interest
(computed from the date of liquidation at the prevailing rate of interest
applied under section 6621 of Title 26) on the amount of lawful duties,
taxes, and fees of which the United States is or may be deprived so long as
such person tenders the unpaid amount of the lawful duties, taxes, and fees
at the time of disclosure, or within 30 days (or such longer period as the
Customs Service may provide) after notice by the Customs Service of its
calculation of such unpaid amount.
209. Id. § 1592.
210. 19 U.S.C. § 1505(c) (2000).
211. National Semiconductor, 496 F.3d at 1361.
212. 19 C.F.R. § 159.11(a) (2007) (“Except as provided in § 159.12, an entry not
liquidated within 1 year from the date of entry of the merchandise, or the date of
final withdrawal of all merchandise covered by a warehouse entry, shall be deemed
liquidated by operation of law.”).
213. National Semiconductor, 496 F.3d at 1361.
214. Id.
215. 497 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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216

As a result of its incorrect designations, Customs found
entries.
that Ford owed approximately $5.3 million in additional duties and
217
The
referred Ford’s errors to its fraud investigation office.
government filed a § 1592 action against Ford at the CIT, seeking
civil penalties for fraud, gross negligence, and negligence pursuant to
218
The CIT dismissed those counts on the bases that the
§ 1592(c).
government failed to accept a waiver from Ford that waived the
219
statute of limitations and issue preclusion, in light of its decision in
220
the last Ford Motor Co. v. United States decision.
The Federal Circuit reversed the CIT’s decision to dismiss because
the waiver was invalid, thereby allowing the statute of limitations to
221
run on both claims for penalties and for duties. Ford asserted that
Customs refused to accept its last waiver by striking the words “and
222
accepted” from the waiver. However, the Federal Circuit found that
a waiver is a “voluntary, unilateral waiver of a defense” that is not
223
incumbent on the other party’s “acceptance.”
Here, Ford’s letter
stated that it “knowingly and voluntarily” “waive[d] the period of
224
limitations . . . with respect to the eleven (11) Customs entries.”
Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that its waiver was a voluntary act
225
sufficient to extend the § 1621 statute of limitations period.
The Federal Circuit also reversed the CIT on issue preclusion.
Ford argued that the operative facts in both cases were essentially the
same and thus concluded that the present case would involve
226
relitigating those same issues. The Federal Circuit held that a prior
proceeding where the government had not properly extended
liquidation of entries and ordered refund of duties did not bar the
government from pursuing civil penalties for fraud involving those
227
same entries. The Federal Circuit further found that the holding in
the last Ford decision was limited to the issue in that case—whether
the government had properly extended the one-year liquidation

216. See id. at 1333–34 (describing how Ford incorrectly stated on forms that it was
importing parts for assembled cars, rather than for assembled trucks, thus benefiting
from an improperly low rate).
217. Id. at 1334.
218. Id. at 1335.
219. Id. at 1333.
220. 286 F.3d 1335, 1336–39 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
221. 497 F.3d at 1336–37.
222. Id. at 1336.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1337.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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deadline pursuant to § 1504(b). Therefore, the court held that the
CIT erred in dismissing the government’s claims based on issue
229
preclusion grounds.
230
Koyo Corp. of U.S.A. v. United States involved two issues, whether an
importer can protest a deemed liquidation and what duty rate applies
if the importer properly protests the deemed liquidation. Koyo
Corporation of U.S.A. (“Koyo”) made three entries of bearings
231
All entries were deemed
subject to an antidumping order.
liquidated according to 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) at the cash deposit rates
232
in effect at the time of entry.
However, Customs had made final
233
assessment determinations at rates lower than the deposit rates.
Koyo protested the liquidation rates, contending that the final
234
assessment rates should be applied.
The Federal Circuit first found that the entries were deemed
235
liquidated by operation of law pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d).
However, it also determined that deemed liquidation did not take
236
away the right of protest.
The government, on the other hand,
contended that deemed liquidation is inherently conclusive, final,
and binding, cannot be protested by an importer, and that the rate of
237
duty asserted at entry is the only duty rate that can be assessed. The
Federal Circuit found that the purpose and legislative history of 19
U.S.C. § 1504 supported the holding that Congress did not intend to
238
remove the importer’s protest remedy. Thus, the court determined
239
The third protest,
that the first two protests were timely filed.
however, presented a genuine issue of material fact, and the court
remanded for further findings to determine whether it was timely
240
With regard to the applicable duty rate, the Federal Circuit
filed.
determined that the duty rate should be that determined in the
241
administrative and judicial reviews.
While a deemed liquidation
makes liquidation final, it does not determine the final duty rate

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id.
Id. at 1338.
497 F.3d 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1233.
Id. at 1234.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1237.
Id.
Id. at 1238.
Id. at 1239.
Id. at 1240.
Id.
Id. at 1243.

2008]

2007 INTERNATIONAL TRADE DECISIONS

1171

242

Therefore, the Federal Circuit
imposed on the imported goods.
affirmed the CIT’s decision to reliquidate the entries in the first two
protests and remanded the entry in the third protest for further
243
findings.
244
In SKF USA, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit vacated and
remanded a CIT decision on the basis that deemed liquidation had
245
made the case moot.
The entries at issue were liquidated by
operation of law before the trial court ruled on SKF USA’s (“SKF”)
246
motion for preliminary injunction. The Federal Circuit applied the
247
Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States rule, which renders a court action
moot once liquidation occurs, stating “[o]nce liquidation occurs, a
subsequent decision by the trial court on the merits of [a] challenge
248
Here, the
can have no effect on the dumping duties assessed.”
Federal Circuit found that the entries at issue were deemed
249
Therefore,
liquidated before the trial court ruled on the motion.
the case was moot as soon as the entries were deemed liquidated.
II. TRADE REMEDY LAWS
The United States Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) and
the United States International Trade Commission (“ITC”) are
responsible for conducting antidumping and countervailing duty
250
If Commerce determines that foreign goods are
investigations.
being sold at “less than fair value,” as calculated under a statutory
251
formula, and if the ITC finds that such sales are injuring or
threatening to injure a domestic industry, or that the establishment
of a domestic industry is materially retarded, Commerce is required
to issue an antidumping order imposing antidumping duties on the
252
imported good. In a countervailing duty investigation, Commerce
determines whether a government or public entity is providing the
producer with a countervailable subsidy to aid in the manufacture,

242. Id. at 1241.
243. Id. at 1243.
244. 246 F. App’x 692 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
245. Id. at 698.
246. Id. at 693–94.
247. 710 F.2d 806 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
248. SKF USA, 246 F. App’x at 695 (quoting Zenith, 710 F.2d at 810).
249. Id. at 694.
250. See United States International Trade Commission, Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Investigations and Reviews, http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy
/731_ad_701_cvd/index.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2008) (describing Commerce and
ITC responsibilities under Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930).
251. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (2000).
252. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a) (2000).
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export, or production of a product, and, in most cases, the ITC also
253
makes an injury determination.
A. United States Department of Commerce
There were sixteen cases in 2007 involving appeals from
Commerce determinations. The trade remedy cases involving
Commerce covered a wide variety of issues, including scope rulings,
duty absorption, and statutory interpretation.
254
In Mukand International, Ltd. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the CIT’s determination denying Mukand International’s
(“Mukand”) reliquidation and refund claim. That case involved the
2001–02 administrative review of Mukand’s entries of stainless steel
bar produced in the United Arab Emirates out of stainless steel wire
rod from India, with Commerce issuing its results determining a final
255
antidumping duty rate on August 11, 2003.
Commerce then
provided notice that Customs would be instructed to liquidate those
256
entries at the determined rate. Mukand did not participate in the
review; however, it submitted a scope ruling application on May 14,
2003, while the administrative review was pending, seeking a
determination of whether its imports fell within the scope of the
257
antidumping order. Commerce did not take any immediate action
258
on that application. More than a year later, Mukand filed an action
in the CIT seeking a writ of mandamus requiring Commerce to issue
a scope determination, suspend further liquidation, reliquidate
entries of stainless steel bar produced in the United Arab Emirates,
259
and refund all of Mukand’s antidumping duties on those entries.
The CIT ruled that, because Mukand failed to take timely action to
prevent its entries from being liquidated and did not diligently
pursue its injunctive remedies, it was not entitled to the requested
260
relief. On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that, while the CIT had
253. 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(a)(1) (2000).
254. 502 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
255. See Antidumping Duty Order: Stainless Steel Bar from Brazil, India and
Japan, 60 Fed. Reg. 9661 (Feb. 21, 1995) (revealing the underlying antidumping duty
order).
256. Mukand, 502 F.3d at 1367.
257. Id. at 1368. Within forty-five days of receiving a scope ruling application,
Commerce must either issue a final ruling on the matter or initiate a “scope inquiry.”
19 C.F.R. § 351.225(c)(2) (2008). If Commerce chooses to initiate a scope inquiry,
and if liquidation of the entry in question has already been suspended, the
suspension of liquidation will continue for the duration of the scope inquiry. Id.
§ 351.225(l).
258. Mukand, 502 F.3d at 1368.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1369.
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jurisdiction to hear the merits of the mandamus petition, Mukand
was not entitled to mandamus because it failed to take advantage of
261
adequate alternative remedies available to it at the time.
“Moreover, at any time before its entries were liquidated and after the
forty-fifth day following the submission of its completed scope ruling
application, Mukand could have filed a mandamus action to compel
Commerce to institute a scope inquiry and order the continued
262
suspension under 19 C.F.R. § 351.225.”
The Federal Circuit also
263
found that Timken Co. v. United States and Shinyei Corp. of America v.
264
United States are both inapposite and would not have barred
Mukand from seeking a writ of mandamus forty-five days after it filed
265
its scope ruling application. Therefore, the Federal Circuit upheld
the CIT’s order dismissing the action.
266
In Parkdale International v. United States, Parkdale International
(“Parkdale”) appealed the CIT determination that Commerce’s
application of its “Reseller Policy” did not have an impermissibly
267
retroactive effect.
Parkdale was a reseller, importer, and exporter
of corrosion-resistant carbon steel products (“CORE”) between
268
Canada and the United States. Parkdale chose not to participate in
the administrative review for the period of review (“POR”) between
269
Parkdale challenged the
August 1, 2002, and July 31, 2003.
preliminary results as an interested party, but Commerce rejected its
270
challenge and issued final results in March 2005. In its final results,
Commerce stated that its May 6, 2003, Reseller Policy would apply to
unreviewed resellers, like Parkdale, who purchased their CORE from
a reviewed producer who did not know its goods were destined for
271
As a result, Parkdale’s subject goods entered
the United States.
during the POR would be liquidated at the “all-others” rate, which
272
was considerably higher than exporter-specific rates in this case.
The Reseller Policy was initially proposed in 1998 and provided that,
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. 893 F.2d 337 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that the alternative remedy of an
injunction was not adequate, thus the third element of a mandamus action, the lack
of an adequate alternative remedy, was met).
264. 355 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that the CIT can still grant relief
after liquidation).
265. Mukand, 502 F.3d at 1369–70.
266. 475 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
267. Id. at 1378.
268. Id. at 1376.
269. Id. at 1377.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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if Commerce determines that the producer did not know that the
merchandise it sold to the reseller was destined for the United States,
the reseller’s merchandise would be liquidated at the all-others
273
rate.
Commerce acknowledged that the Reseller Policy gave rise to
274
relatively significant change for affected parties. Parkdale claimed
that Canadian resellers had every reason to believe, at the time of
importation, that their imports were subject to existing practice, not
275
the all-others rate. Commerce nonetheless adopted the policy, and
Parkdale filed suit in the CIT, arguing that the application of the
276
Reseller Policy had an impermissibly retroactive effect.
The CIT
denied its challenge, and Parkdale appealed.
In its analysis, the Federal Circuit relayed that, to determine
whether the application of a law or policy is impermissibly retroactive,
it must examine the “‘nature and extent of the change of the law,’
‘the degree of connection between the operation of the new rule and
a relevant past event,’ and ‘considerations of fair notice, reasonable
277
While the government
reliance, and settled expectations.’”
conceded that the policy was a significant change, the Federal Circuit
found that the other two factors weighed heavily in favor of the
278
The Federal Circuit noted that there was not a
government.
“significant retroactive connection with past events,” since the degree
of connection between the policy and Parkdale’s subject entries was
279
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit concluded that there
minimal.
was adequate notice to Parkdale, especially in light of the Federal
Circuit’s recent holdings that liquidation of entries is the operative
event for deciding whether application of a statute or regulation is
280
impermissibly retroactive.
Parkdale could not have had an
objectively reasonable settled expectation of what its duty rate would
281
be until liquidation. Moreover, since 1998, Parkdale was on notice

273. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Proceedings:
Assessment of
Antidumping Duties, 63 Fed. Reg. 55,361 (Oct. 15, 1998).
274. Parkdale, 475 F.3d at 1378.
275. Id. at 1379.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 1378–79 (quoting Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States, 397 F.3d 1358,
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
278. Id. at 1380.
279. Id. at 1379 (quoting Princess Cruises, 397 F.3d at 1366).
280. See, e.g., Travenol Labs., Inc. v. United States, 118 F.3d 749, 753 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (holding that liquidation is the operative event because liquidation defines the
basis upon which interest may be due by deciding whether there has been an
overpayment or an underpayment).
281. Parkdale, 475 F.3d at 1380.
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282

Therefore, the
that Commerce might adopt the Reseller Policy.
283
Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s determination.
284
In Viraj Group v. United States, the Federal Circuit reversed the
CIT’s decision that held that Commerce incorrectly applied the
285
collapsing regulation to the Viraj Group (“Viraj”).
In that case,
Commerce conducted an antidumping duty investigation of stainless
286
steel bar imports from India. Certain regulations allow Commerce,
as part of its investigation, to treat affiliated companies as though
287
Viraj’s appeal concerned whether Viraj met
they were one entity.
each of the requirements in the collapsing regulation, such that
Commerce should have treated Viraj as one group in its
288
The relevant Viraj
administrative review for the 2000–01 POR.
companies during the 2000–01 POR were: (1) Viraj Impoexpo, Ltd.
(“VIL”); (2) Viraj Alloys, Ltd. (“VAL”); and (3) Viraj Forgings, Ltd.
289
(“VFL”).
In 2002, Commerce made a final determination that the Viraj
Group should be collapsed (i.e., treated as a single entity) for
290
On appeal, the CIT found that
calculating its dumping margin.
Commerce’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence and
remanded to Commerce to reanalyze the collapsing decision and
291
Commerce
revise its dumping margin calculation if necessary.
reconsidered its collapsing analysis and found that collapsing was
permissible under the statute because VAL could produce equivalent
292
products to VIL without substantial retooling. The CIT remanded
Commerce’s determinations twice, each time finding that
293
Commerce’s decision to collapse the Viraj Group was incorrect.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. 476 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
285. Id. at 1359.
286. Id. at 1351–52; see Antidumping Duty Order: Stainless Steel Bar from Brazil,
India, and Japan, 60 Fed. Reg. 9661 (Feb. 21, 1995) (specifying the antidumping
duty orders on stainless-steel bar imported from Brazil, India, and Japan).
287. For example, one regulation provides:
In an antidumping proceeding under this part, the Secretary will treat two or
more affiliated producers as a single entity where those producers have
production facilities for similar or identical products that would not require
substantial retooling of either facility in order to restructure manufacturing
priorities and the Secretary concludes that there is a significant potential for
the manipulation of price or production.
19 C.F.R. § 351.401(f)(1) (2007).
288. Viraj, 476 F.3d at 1351–54.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 1352.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1351–54.
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Commerce complied with the CIT’s instructions to calculate separate
294
The CIT affirmed
dumping margins for VAL and VIL/VFL.
295
Viraj
Commerce’s separate dumping margin calculation.
296
challenged that decision in an appeal to the Federal Circuit.
The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that the Viraj Group
satisfied all the requirements set forth in 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(f)(1) to
297
collapse the company.
The court found that the second prong—
that the companies must have “production facilities for similar or
identical products that would not require substantial retooling of
either facility in order to restructure manufacturing priorities”—was
298
ambiguous on its face because the word “either” was unclear. The
CIT stated that the regulation required Commerce to “examine the
production facilities of both (or all) companies and evaluate the
possibility that production may be shifted from one company to
299
Commerce, on the other hand, believed
another and vice versa.”
that it was sufficient if any one company could shift production to
300
another, without substantial retooling.
The Federal Circuit found
that Commerce’s definition was more consistent with the purpose of
the regulation because it allowed Commerce to collapse companies
301
where manipulation could occur in any one direction.
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit found that the collapsing
regulation only required similarity among the products produced,
302
not among the facilities that produced them. The CIT had stated
303
that the production facilities had to be similar.
Lastly, the Federal Circuit addressed the application of the major
304
input rule in deciding whether to collapse affiliated companies.
“The major input rule, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(3), provides
Commerce discretion in valuing one company’s production input,
when the company receives that input from an affiliated company at
305
The CIT
a price less than the cost of production for the input.”
stated that because VIL/VFL purchases an important material input
from its affiliate VAL, application of this rule would accentuate

294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

Id. at 1354.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1355.
Id. at 1355–56.
Id. at 1355.
Id. at 1355–56.
Id. at 1356.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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“potential misstatements” in costs that would arise if Viraj Group were
306
The Federal Circuit found that Congress
treated as one entity.
made a delegation on this issue to the agency, pursuant to Chevron,
307
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
Further,
Commerce’s practice in implementing the major input rule was
308
found to be reasonable. The Federal Circuit noted that its decision
309
was not dictated by AK Steel Corp. v. United States because AK Steel
dealt with the application of the major input rule once it had
310
Here,
properly determined that companies should be collapsed.
the Federal Circuit was considering application when deciding
311
whether to collapse affiliated entities. However, the conclusion was
the same—“Commerce’s practice, to either treat affiliated companies
as one or to consider transactions among the companies under the
312
fair value and major input rules, is reasonable.”
Therefore, the
Federal Circuit reversed the CIT’s decision on the collapsing
313
regulation, reinstating Commerce’s original determination.
In yet another Federal Circuit case involving the same issue,
314
Carpenter Technology Corp. v. United States, the Federal Circuit upheld
Commerce’s decision to collapse the three companies within the
315
Viraj Group for the purpose of calculating antidumping duties.
This case involved the same issue but an antidumping duty order
involving a different product—stainless steel wire rod (“SSWR”) from
316
India. The same three Viraj entities were at issue: VAL, VFL, and
317
VIL. In its analysis of the collapsing regulation, the Federal Circuit
determined that only two prongs were involved—the substantial
retooling of production facilities and the significant potential for
318
manipulation. The Federal Circuit first found that the Viraj Group
satisfied the substantial retooling of production facilities prong of the
319
collapsing entity analysis.
The Viraj entities all utilized the same
facility to make SSWR from steel billets since they used the same

306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

Id. at 1357.
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Viraj, 476 F.3d at 1358.
226 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Viraj, 476 F.3d at 1358.
Id.
Id.
Id.
510 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1371.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1373.
Id. at 1373–74.
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The Federal Circuit also found that no retooling
subcontractor.
321
would be required since they all utilized the same facilities.
Second, the Federal Circuit determined that there was significant
322
potential for manipulation.
It took into consideration that
Commerce had found all three companies had the same two
directors, that those directors effectively controlled all three
companies, that those directors and their relatives were the principal
stockholders, and that their operations were substantially
323
Thus, the factual findings on these two issues
intertwined.
demonstrated that Commerce’s determination was supported by
324
substantial evidence.
325
In NSK Ltd. v. United States, the Federal Circuit upheld the CIT’s
determination sustaining Commerce’s use of “facts otherwise
available” and “adverse inferences” when determining the four
326
appellants’ (collectively known as “NTN”) antidumping margin.
This case involved the twelfth administrative review of an
antidumping order covering certain antifriction bearings imported
327
As part of the review, Commerce allowed NTN to
from Japan.
allocate its freight expenses, if necessary, according to the basis on
328
which the expenses were incurred, such as weight or volume.
If
NTN was unable to allocate its freight expenses according to the
bases on which they were incurred, “Commerce required NTN to
(1) explain how it allocated the expenses, (2) explain why it could
not allocate them on the bases on which they were incurred, and
(3) demonstrate that the allocation method that NTN selected in its
329
response was not distortive.”
NTN chose to allocate its freight
330
In response to Commerce’s
expenses according to sales value.
requests for further information, NTN asserted that its allocation was
not distortive because it based freight expenses on the factor
common to each shipment—sales value—but the firm did not
331
provide the supporting data requested by Commerce.
Commerce
rejected NTN’s allocation methodology and determined freight

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Id. at 1373.
Id.
Id. at 1374.
Id.
Id.
481 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1361.
Id. at 1357.
Id. at 1358.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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expenses by “drawing adverse inferences” from “facts otherwise
332
available,” pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677e.
The Federal Circuit determined that NTN failed to justify
333
allocating expenses on a basis not used in incurring them.
The
relevant regulation specifically requires that the respondent
demonstrate that the proposed method did not cause inaccuracies or
distortions and that the respondent has allocated its expenses on as
334
NTN failed to demonstrate that
specific a basis as is feasible.
allocation by sales value is not distortive or inaccurate, only offering
335
conclusory assertions without full explanations. Also, NTN did not
provide any evidence to support its assertion that allocation by sales
336
value was as specific as feasible.
337
In Crawfish Processors Alliance v. United States, the Federal Circuit
affirmed a CIT decision sustaining a scope ruling by Commerce that
crawfish etouffee is not included within the scope of an antidumping
338
duty order covering freshwater crawfish tail meat. On June 4, 2004,
Coastal Foods, LLC (“Coastal”), requested a scope ruling from
339
Commerce to determine whether the antidumping duty order
340
included crawfish etouffee within its scope.
Commerce, pursuant
to its regulations, under § 351.225(k)(1), had considered the
language of the order but found that the language did not resolve
341
In particular, Commerce evaluated the different
the inquiry.
interpretations of what constitutes “preserved” or “prepared” and
342
whether the tail meat had been transformed into another product.
Accordingly, Commerce weighed the additional Diversified Products
343
344
Corp. v. United States factors as set forth in § 351.225(k)(2) to find

332. Id. at 1359.
333. Id. at 1359–60.
334. 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(g) (2007).
335. NSK, 481 F.3d at 1360.
336. Id.
337. 483 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
338. Id. at 1359.
339. Antidumping Duty Order: Freshwater Crawfish Tail Meat From the People’s
Republic of China, 62 Fed. Reg. 48,218 (Sept. 15, 1997).
340. Crawfish Processors Alliance, 483 F.3d at 1359–60.
341. Id. at 1360; cf. Antidumping Duty Order: Freshwater Crawfish Tail Meat
From the People’s Republic of China, 62 Fed. Reg. at 48,219 (describing the issue as
concerning “freshwater crawfish tail meat, in all its forms (whether washed or with fat
on, whether purged or unpurged), grades, and sizes; whether frozen, fresh, or
chilled; and regardless of how it is packed, preserved, or prepared”).
342. Crawfish Processors Alliance, 483 F.3d at 1360.
343. 6 Ct. Int’l Trade 155 (1983).
344. Those factors include the physical characteristics of the product, the
expectations of the ultimate purchasers, the ultimate use of the product, the
channels of trade in which the product is sold, and the manner in which the product
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that the etouffee had undergone substantial transformation into a
new and different product beyond the crawfish tail meat covered by
345
the order. The CIT agreed with and sustained Commerce’s scope
ruling.
Despite Crawfish Processors Alliance’s (“CPA”) arguments to the
contrary, the Federal Circuit found that the language of the scope
order was not dispositive to determine whether etouffee is included
within the order and that Commerce had properly considered the
346
Diversified Products factors.
The court noted that the ingredients
had penetrated the tail meat and permanently altered its original
347
flavor, evidence of a substantial transformation.
The Federal
348
Circuit also addressed CPA’s reliance on Orlando Food v. United States
in its argument that the addition of other ingredients did not
349
fundamentally change the underlying product.
Orlando Food was
factually distinguishable because the mere addition of seasonings to
whole tomatoes in that case did not alter the essential tomato
350
character of the product.
Therefore, the Federal Circuit upheld
the CIT’s decision that etouffee is not included within the scope of
351
the antidumping duty order.
In another case involving the CPA, Crawfish Processors Alliance v.
352
United States, the Federal Circuit addressed whether a transfer of
353
cash or assets was required to prove affiliation.
In that matter,
Commerce had determined that Fujian Pelagic Fishery Group Co.
(“Fujian”) and Pacific Coast Fisheries Corp. (“Pacific Coast”), two
companies that initiated a civil action to contest Commerce’s
354
However, the record
antidumping decision, were not affiliated.
showed that Fujian owned and exercised a sufficient amount of
Pacific Coast’s public shares—more than five percent—during the
355
POR.
This was an issue of statutory interpretation for the Federal
356
Circuit.
Affiliated parties are defined in the statute as “[a]ny
is advertised and displayed. 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2) (2007), cited in Crawfish
Processors Alliance, 483 F.3d at 1360.
345. Crawfish Processors Alliance, 483 F.3d at 1361.
346. Id. at 1362–63.
347. Id. at 1363.
348. 140 F.3d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
349. Crawfish Processors Alliance, 483 F.3d at 1363.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 1364.
352. 477 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
353. Id. at 1384.
354. Id. at 1378.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 1379.
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person directly or indirectly owning, controlling, or holding with
power to vote, [five] percent or more of the outstanding voting stock
357
or shares of any organization and such organization.” The Federal
Circuit held that the statute clarified that owning, controlling or
holding “directly or indirectly” over five percent of an entity’s stock
358
The plain language of the statute did not
constitutes “affiliation.”
require the transfer of cash or merchandise to show ownership of five
359
percent or more of the shares as Commerce had interpreted. Here,
under the law of the State of Washington where Pacific Coast issued
the stock to Fujian, a promissory note to purchase stock or shares of a
360
corporation constituted sufficient proof.
The Federal Circuit
further found no reason to apply Chevron deference to Commerce’s
361
interpretation in this case. Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that
the companies were, in fact, affiliated, and reversed the CIT’s
determination that 19 U.S.C. § 1677(33)(E) requires proof of full
362
payment in cash or merchandise during the POR.
363
Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States involved issues of statutory
364
In this case, the Federal
construction and agency deference.
Circuit reversed the CIT and held that Commerce’s interpretation of
“United States import duties” under 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A) was
365
reasonable. Here, § 201 safeguard duties were in effect during the
366
POR.
According to 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A), Commerce is
required to decrease an exporter’s export price by the amount of
“any additional costs, charges, or expenses, and United States import
duties, which are incident to bringing the subject merchandise from
the original place of shipment in the exporting country to the place
367
of delivery in the United States.” Commerce had previously never
ruled on this issue, but found here that § 201 safeguards were not
deductible from the export price in calculating the antidumping
368
margin.
Wheatland Tube, the domestic producer, contested Commerce’s
treatment of § 201 safeguard duties, arguing that they qualified as
357. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(33)(E) (2000).
358. Crawfish Processors Alliance, 477 F.3d at 1380.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 1381.
361. See id. at 1380 (observing that Chevron deference is not necessary where an
agency’s interpretation is put forth in the midst of litigation).
362. Id. at 1382.
363. 495 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
364. Id. at 1357.
365. Id.
366. See id. (referring to duties imposed under 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000)).
367. Id. at 1358 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A) (2000)) (emphasis added).
368. Id.
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369

“United States import duties” and therefore should be deducted
370
The CIT agreed with Wheatland Tube,
from the export price.
stating that the effect of Commerce not including safeguard duties
was to improperly negate the § 201 duty imposed by the President,
artificially decrease Respondent’s antidumping margin, and upset the
371
balance between § 201 and antidumping duties.
The issue before the Federal Circuit was whether § 201 duties are
“United States import duties” that can be deducted from the export
372
The case was
price in determining an antidumping margin.
373
essentially one of statutory interpretation of § 1677a(c)(2)(A). The
Federal Circuit conducted a Chevron analysis to determine whether
374
Commerce’s statutory interpretation was entitled to deference.
In this case, the Federal Circuit found that Congress had not
defined or explained the meaning of “United States import duties,”
375
In
and therefore proceeded to step two of the Chevron analysis.
376
United States v. Mead, the Supreme Court held that an agency’s
statutory interpretation qualifies for Chevron deference if the
interpretation is the result of the agency’s formal notice-and377
Here, Commerce posted notice
comment rulemaking process.
requesting comments on the treatment of § 201 duties, and at the
completion of the formal notice-and-comment period, it filed its final
ruling that § 201 safeguard duties are not United States import duties
for purposes of 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A) and therefore should not
378
be deducted from the export price in calculating dumping margin.
Because this ruling was the result of Commerce’s formal notice-and-

369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 1359 (citing Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States, 414 F. Supp. 2d
1271, 1283 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006)).
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. A Chevron analysis requires the court to address two questions. Id. “The first
step of Chevron is to determine ‘whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.’” Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)). Under the second step of Chevron, “if Congress
expressly or implicitly delegated authority to an agency to interpret a statute by
authorizing the agency to issue substantive rules or regulations, [the] court must give
deference to the agency’s interpretation of the statute as promulgated in the rules or
regulations if the agency’s interpretation is ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 1360. Step two of
Chevron applies only where “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue.” Id. at 1359 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
375. Id. at 1359–60.
376. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
377. Id. at 226–27.
378. Wheatland Tube, 495 F.3d at 1358.
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comment rulemaking process, under step two of Chevron the court
was obliged to “defer to [the] agency’s reasonable interpretation of a
statute and [could] not substitute its own judgment for that of the
agency even if the court might have preferred another interpretation
and even if the agency’s interpretation is not the only reasonable
379
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit noted that it usually gives
one.”
Commerce’s interpretation of antidumping laws significant deference
380
because of its expertise in administering the antidumping duty laws.
In reaching its determination that the interpretation of “United
States import duties” was reasonable, the Federal Circuit first
considered that the legislative history distinguished normal customs
381
duties from “special dumping duties.” The court found that § 201
duties were more like antidumping duties than normal customs
duties because they were remedial relief from the adverse effects of
382
Further, if § 201 duties were included as “United States
imports.
import duties,” Commerce would improperly collect § 201 safeguard
383
duties twice.
Therefore, the Federal Circuit determined that
Commerce’s interpretation that “United States import duties” does
not include § 201 safeguard duties for the purposes of determining
the export price and calculating the dumping margin was
384
reasonable.
385
In Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bag Committee v. United States, the
Federal Circuit affirmed a CIT decision finding that Commerce’s
determination that two respondents had de minimis dumping margins
and should be excluded from the antidumping order was supported
386
The appellant in the case challenged
by substantial evidence.
Commerce’s methodology in applying “facts otherwise available” to
387
the factors of production.
The Federal Circuit found that Commerce’s decision to apply facts
388
The
otherwise available was supported by substantial evidence.
court stated that “the application of adverse inferences is not
intended to be punitive; rather, Congress ‘intended for an adverse
379. Id. at 1360–61 (citing Koyo Seiko Co., Ltd. v. United States, 36 F.3d 1565,
1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994); PPG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 928 F.2d 1568, 1571 (Fed.
Cir. 1991)).
380. Id. at 1361 (citing Ta Chen Stainless Steel Pipe, Inc. v. United States, 298 F.3d
1330, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Koyo Seiko, 36 F.3d at 1750).
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 1362.
384. Id. at 1363.
385. 232 F. App’x 965 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
386. Id. at 967.
387. Id. at 968 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677e (2000)).
388. Id.
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facts available rate to be a reasonably accurate estimate of the
respondent’s actual rate, albeit with some built-in increase intended
389
as a deterrent to non-compliance.’” The Federal Circuit found that
Commerce had complied with that standard in determining that its
findings of the factors of production were “adverse” within the
390
In concluding that substantial
meaning of 19 U.S.C. § 1677e.
evidence supported Commerce’s determinations, the court noted the
broad discretion granted to the agency in valuing factors of
production, as well as the thoroughness of Commerce’s investigation
391
and reasonableness of the methodologies employed.
392
In Corus Staal BV v. United States (Corus Staal II), the Federal
Circuit upheld Commerce’s use of zeroing and classification of the
disputed sales transactions, as well as its finding that Corus Staal BV
(“Corus”) had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies with
393
Corus argued that Commerce’s
regard to its absorption claim.
announcement, in light of WTO determinations, that it would
394
abandon the use of zeroing methodology in average-to-average
comparisons to calculate weighted average dumping margins in
antidumping investigations, demonstrated that Commerce has
395
abandoned its policy of zeroing, which the Federal Circuit had
previously held was a permissible interpretation of the statutory
396
provisions.
However, the Federal Circuit found that Commerce’s
statements did not change with respect to retroactive application of
397
Commerce intended to apply its new
the zeroing methodology.
389. Id. at 969 (quoting F. Lii De Cecco Di Filippo Fara S. Martino S.p.A. v. United
States, 216 F.3d 1027, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
390. Id.
391. Id. at 969–70.
392. 502 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
393. Id. at 1372.
394. According to the court:
“Zeroing” is a method of calculating weighted average dumping margins
[whereby] Commerce first determines a dumping margin for U.S. sales of a
particular product by comparing the transaction price with the monthly
weighted average “normal value” of that product, i.e., the price charged for
the product in its home market. Commerce then aggregates the dumping
margins for all U.S. sales made below normal value. With respect to all U.S.
sales made above normal value (i.e., non-dumped sales), Commerce assigns
a dumping margin of zero. Thus, when Commerce calculates the weighted
average dumping margin, the dumping margins for sales below normal value
are not offset by “negative dumping margins” for those sales made above
normal value.
Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (2000) (describing the calculation of normal value)).
395. Id. at 1373.
396. Id. at 1372 (citing Corus Staal BV v. Dep’t of Commerce (Corus Staal I), 395
F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Timken Co. v. United States, 354 F.3d 1334, 1340–
45 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
397. Id. at 1374.
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398

Furthermore, the Federal Circuit noted
policy only prospectively.
that it accords Commerce substantial deference in its administration
399
of the antidumping statute. In this case, Commerce made it clear
that those changes do not apply retroactively to administrative
400
reviews.
Second, the Federal Circuit determined that certain sales to an
unaffiliated U.S. customer were properly classified as constructed
401
export price (“CEP”) rather than export price (“EP”) transactions.
Commerce found, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, that the final
402
sales occurred after the date of importation.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s determination that Corus
had not exhausted its administrative remedies on the duty absorption
claim, finding that the “futility exception” Corus raised did not
403
apply.
The futility exception applied only in situations in which
enforcing the exhaustion requirement would mean that parties
“would be ‘required to go through obviously useless motions in order
404
to preserve their rights.’” The Federal Circuit thus found that the
policies requiring exhaustion stated that, absent a strong contrary
reason, the court should insist that parties exhaust their remedies
405
before the pertinent administrative agencies.
The Federal Circuit addressed zeroing again in NSK Ltd. v. United
406
States. There, NSK, NTN Corporation (“NTN”), and Koyo appealed
Commerce’s application of zeroing in its weighted-average dumping
407
The court reiterated the determination it
margin calculations.
408
made in Corus Staal I,
stating that it would not overturn
Commerce’s zeroing practice based on any ruling by the WTO until
such ruling had been adopted pursuant to a specific statutory
409
scheme.

398. Id.
399. Id. at 1375; accord Corus Staal I, 395 F.3d at 1349.
400. Corus Staal II, 502 F.3d at 1375.
401. Id. at 1375–76.
402. Id. at 1376.
403. Id. at 1378–81.
404. Id. at 1379 (quoting Bendure v. United States, 554 F.2d 427, 431 (Ct. Cl.
1977)).
405. Id. at 1379; see 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d) (2000) (“[T]he Court of International
Trade shall, where appropriate, require the exhaustion of administrative remedies.”).
406. 510 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
407. Id. at 1378.
408. Corus Staal BV v. Dep’t of Commerce (Corus Staal I), 395 F.3d 1343, 1349
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
409. NSK, 510 F.3d at 1380.
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The second issue in NSK involved Koyo’s billing adjustment
410
While
allocations, which Commerce found to be distortive.
Commerce had previously accepted similar data in a past review, it
determined that Koyo had not satisfied its burden of demonstrating
411
that methodology was non-distortive in the instant review.
The
Federal Circuit agreed, finding that Commerce’s determination was
412
supported by substantial evidence.
Third, the Federal Circuit held that Commerce’s decision to
include small-volume, high-profit home market sales in its value
413
calculations was supported by substantial evidence.
NTN argued
414
However, this was
that inclusion of these sales was distortive.
contradicted by its submissions before the CIT, wherein it stated that
these sales were made fairly regularly in the general course of
415
business.
Lastly, the Federal Circuit determined that NSK’s
challenge to Commerce’s model-match methodology was not ripe for
416
review because the policy had not been adopted yet.
Commerce
had merely issued a memorandum indicating that it considered
changing the model-match approach it used for antidumping orders;
however, it had not abandoned its previous methodology and
417
Commerce had further stated that it would
adopted a new one.
418
offer a notice and comment period on the proposed change.
Therefore, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s dismissal of NSK’s
419
challenge.
420
The issues in Eurodif S.A. v. United States were also dismissed by
the Federal Circuit as being unripe because they concerned
421
application to future entries of the subject merchandise. This case
concerned future entries of low enriched uranium (“LEU”) that were
to be made pursuant to separate work unit (“SWU”) contracts made
422
by Eurodif, S.A. (“Eurodif”).
In previous litigation, the Federal
Circuit held that SWU contracts were not subject to the antidumping

410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.

Id. at 1381.
Id.
Id. at 1382.
Id. at 1384.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1385.
Id.
Id.
Id.
506 F.3d 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1053.
Id.
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statute because they were contracts for the sale of services. Eurodif
argued that Commerce should be permitted to suspend liquidation
of future LEU imports until it determines whether the SWU contract
424
exception applies. However, the CIT held that the proper manner
in which to address whether merchandise is within the scope of an
425
order is through a scope determination. That determination would
be reviewable by the CIT. Furthermore, the issue was a speculative
one—“what may or may not happen in the next LEU case, a case
426
Therefore, since there was an
about which there were no facts.”
adequate administrative remedy, the case was dismissed as being
427
unripe.
428
Magnola Metallurgy, Inc. v. United States, involved a new shipper
429
review of a countervailing duty order concerning alloy magnesium.
Magnola Metallurgy, Inc. (“Magnola”) was found to have received
reimbursements from the government of Quebec through its
Manpower Training Measure program (“MTM program”), which was
430
In its
designed to improve and develop Quebec’s labor market.
review, Commerce determined that Magnola’s 1998 and 2000 MTM
program reimbursements were non-recurring subsidies as defined in
19 C.F.R. § 351.524(c), for which the benefits extended beyond the
431
As such, it decided to
period that the subsidy was conferred.
amortize those benefits over a fourteen-year period pursuant to 19
432
C.F.R. § 351.524(d)(2)(i).
The Federal Circuit first addressed the issue of whether Commerce
was required to make a de novo finding of specificity in its 2003
433
administrative review.
Absent new facts or evidence, however, the
434
specificity determination made in the new shipper review remained.
The Federal Circuit noted that the statutory language on which
435
Magnola relied was ambiguous. The Federal Circuit has previously
423. See Eurodif S.A. v. United States, 423 F.3d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); Eurodif
S.A. v. United States, 411 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
424. Eurodif, 506 F.3d at 1053.
425. Id. at 1054 (citing Eurodif S.A. v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1356
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2006)).
426. Id. at 1055.
427. Id.
428. 508 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
429. Id. at 1351.
430. Id. at 1351–52.
431. Id. at 1352.
432. Id.
433. Id. at 1354.
434. Id.
435. Id. Specifically, the statutory language at issue was: “review and determine
the amount of any net countervailable subsidy.” Id. (citing 19 U.S.C § 1675
(a)(1)(2000)).
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held that statutory interpretations articulated by Commerce during
436
adjudicatory proceedings are entitled to Chevron deference. Here,
nothing convinced the court that Commerce’s interpretation of the
statute was unreasonable, and, thus, the Federal Circuit deferred to
437
Commerce’s interpretation.
The Federal Circuit also found that
Magnola’s argument that it had new evidence requiring Commerce
to revisit its original determination was irrelevant because this simply
438
dealt with the amortization of the subsidy.
Additionally, the Federal Circuit concluded that it did not have to
reexamine whether the specificity determination made in the new
439
shipper review was clearly erroneous and should be reexamined.
The Federal Circuit found that the Supreme Court case Interstate
440
Commerce Commission v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers directly
441
addressed this issue. There, the court denied judicial review of an
442
agency’s refusal to reconsider on the ground of material error. In
other cases, the Court has held that an agency’s refusal to reopen a
443
closed case is an issue committed to agency discretion. The Federal
Circuit therefore held that Commerce was not required to determine
whether it should reconsider its earlier specificity determination
444
based on alleged error in the original decision.
445
In Agro Dutch Industries Ltd. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
reversed the CIT’s decision to affirm Commerce’s interpretation of
the term “affiliation” in 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(4) and its affirmative
446
The antidumping statute allows
finding of duty absorption.
Commerce, in the second or fourth administrative reviews, to
determine whether antidumping duties have been absorbed by a
foreign producer or exporter if the subject merchandise is sold in the
United States through an importer who is affiliated with such foreign
447
producer or exporter.
Commerce conducted a duty absorption
analysis of Agro Dutch Industries, Ltd. (“Agro”) and found that

436. Id. at 1355.
437. Id.
438. Id. at 1356.
439. Id. at 1357.
440. 482 U.S. 270 (1987).
441. Magnola, 508 F.3d at 1357.
442. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. at 280.
443. E.g., Your Home Visiting Nurse Servs., Inc. v. Shalala, 525 U.S. 449, 457
(1999).
444. Magnola, 508 F.3d at 1357–58.
445. 508 F.3d 1024 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
446. Id. at 1033–34.
447. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(4) (2000).
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antidumping duties had been absorbed by Agro instead of being
448
passed on to customers.
Agro appealed with the sole contention that Commerce could not
properly conduct a duty absorption analysis because Agro did not sell
its merchandise “in the United States through an importer who is
449
affiliated” with Agro, as required by § 1675(a)(4). However, before
reaching the merits, the Federal Circuit agreed with the CIT that,
although Agro failed to raise the argument that formed the basis for
the appeal during the Commerce proceedings, the court could
address Agro’s argument on appeal because it implicated a pure
450
question of law.
The Federal Circuit held that the application of
exhaustion principles is generally subject to the discretion of the
451
CIT.
The CIT had previously articulated a “pure question of law”
452
The
exception to the exhaustion requirement in trade cases.
Federal Circuit determined that the CIT had not abused its discretion
453
in the instant case.
In reaching the merits, the Federal Circuit conducted a Chevron
454
statutory analysis. Here, the dispute focused on whether the phrase
“through an importer who is affiliated with such foreign producer or
455
456
exporter” encompassed Agro.
The Federal Circuit first found
457
that the meaning of the term “affiliated” required two parties.
Furthermore, it found that that interpretation of the term should be
458
consistent with its use elsewhere in the antidumping laws.
In this
case, it was undisputed that Agro was acting as its own importer of
459
record.
Thus, according to the unambiguous meaning of the
statutory terms, a company cannot be an “affiliate” with itself, and the

448. Agro, 508 F.3d at 1026–27.
449. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(4) (2000); Agro, 508 F.3d at 1028.
450. Agro, 508 F.3d at 1029.
451. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d) (2000); Corus Staal BV v. United States (Corus
Staal II), 502 F.3d 1370, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
452. See Consol. Bearings Co. V. United States, 166 F. Supp. 2d 580, 587 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2001) (stating that the requirements for the “pure question of law” exception
are that the plaintiff raise a new argument that is of a purely legal nature, that the
inquiry not require further agency involvement or fact-finding, and that the inquiry
not create undue delay or cause expenditure of party time and resources), rev’d 348
F.3d 997, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
453. Agro, 508 F.3d at 1029.
454. Id. at 1030.
455. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(4) (2000).
456. Agro, 508 F.3d at 1030.
457. Id. at 1030–31.
458. Id. at 1032–33.
459. Id. at 1030.
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Federal Circuit held that Commerce was not empowered to conduct
460
a duty absorption inquiry under § 1675(a)(4).
461
In American Signature, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
reversed the CIT’s dismissal of American Signature, Inc.’s (“ASI”)
complaint for lack of jurisdiction and remanded for further
462
The case centered on an antidumping investigation
proceedings.
463
of wooden bedroom furniture from the People’s Republic of China.
During the course of the investigation, Commerce made numerous
464
After
ministerial errors that affected the cash deposit rates.
publication of the preliminary determination, Commerce issued
revised instructions to correct those errors, but only for entries on or
after the date of publication of the amended preliminary
465
determination.
Commerce made similar errors in its final
determination, which it corrected through an amended final
466
However, in its liquidation
determination reducing the rates.
instructions, it directed Customs to assess duties at the cash deposit
467
rates in effect at the time of entry. As a result, for entries between
the date of the preliminary determination and the amended
preliminary determination, and for entries between the date of the
final determination and the amended final determination, duties
were assessed at the cash deposit rates erroneously calculated by
468
Commerce. ASI challenged Commerce’s liquidation instructions to
469
apply the reduced rates retroactively to the interim periods.
The CIT dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Specifically, the CIT concluded that jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581(i)(4) was improper because the claim actually challenged the
final determination and, therefore, it should have been brought
under § 1581(c), which grants the CIT jurisdiction over final
470
reviewable determinations under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a.
The Federal
Circuit, however, found that liquidation instructions were properly
471
reviewed under § 1581(i)(4).
While the government alleged that

460. Id. at 1033.
461. No. 2007-1216, 2007 WL 4224210 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 30, 2007).
462. Id. at * 1.
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Id.
469. Id.
470. Id. at *2.
471. Id. (citing Consol. Bearings Co. v. United States, 348 F.3d 997, 1002–03 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)) (holding that liquidation instructions are properly reviewed under
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the true nature of ASI’s challenge was to Commerce’s underlying
final determination, the Federal Circuit determined that ASI’s claim
472
Thus, it reversed
concerned Commerce’s liquidation instructions.
the CIT’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings consistent
473
with its opinion.
474
In Sango International L.P. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
reversed and remanded a CIT decision affirming an antidumping
475
duty scope determination. The products at issue were imported gas
meter swivels and gas meter nuts imported by Sango International
476
L.P. (“Sango”). Commerce had determined that these swivels and
nuts were within the scope of the antidumping duty order covering
malleable iron pipe fittings from the People’s Republic of China
based on factors set forth in 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1), which include
the descriptions of the merchandise in the petition, initial
477
investigation, and other determinations by Commerce and the ITC.
Only if those descriptions are not dispositive should Commerce
consider the enumerated criteria of 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2).
Commerce found that the description according to the sources listed
478
in 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1) was dispositive.
The CIT determined that the products did not fall within the
express exceptions within the antidumping order, and thereby held
479
that Commerce’s findings were supported by substantial evidence.
The Federal Circuit, however, found that the language of the relevant
documents relied upon by Commerce did not provide substantial
480
The
evidence to support Commerce’s scope determination.
Federal Circuit specifically examined the evidence suggesting that gas
meter swivels and nuts differ from “traditional” pipe fittings because
the flanged end of the swivel only mates and seals to a gas meter
481
through the use of a meter nut. Thus, the swivels and meter nuts
482
The
served no purpose in a piping system without a gas meter.
Federal Circuit found that the fittings covered by the order serve to
connect only to pipes, while gas meter swivels and nuts never appear
§ 1581(i)(4) because they concern the administration and enforcement of
Commerce’s final determination).
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. 484 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
475. Id. at 1382.
476. Id. at 1375.
477. Id. at 1377.
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. Id. at 1381–82.
481. Id. at 1381.
482. Id.
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483

Thus, the Federal Circuit
in a piping system without a gas meter.
held that Commerce should have considered the additional criteria
set forth in 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2) to determine whether gas
484
meter swivels and nuts are within the scope of the Order.
B. United States International Trade Commission
The ITC is charged with determining whether the domestic
industry is materially injured, or is threatened with material injury, or
whether the imports or sales of subject merchandise have materially
485
retarded the establishment of a U.S. industry.
Only if the ITC
makes an affirmative injury determination, can Commerce issue an
486
antidumping or, in most cases, countervailing duty order. Two CIT
decisions in ITC cases were appealed to the Federal Circuit in 2007,
487
both dealing with issues of the ITC’s material injury determination.
488
In Cleo Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s
decision upholding a determination by the ITC that imports of bulk
and consumer tissue paper from China were materially injuring the
489
domestic tissue paper industry.
Cleo Inc. (“Cleo”) and Target
Corp. (“Target”) were domestic companies importing tissue paper
490
from China.
Both companies appealed the ITC’s like product
determination and material injury determination on four points:
(1) that the Commission incorrectly found that bulk and consumer
tissue paper are a single like product, (2) that the Commission
improperly considered Cleo’s and Target’s imports in its material
injury determination and that its causation analysis was thus flawed,
(3) that the Commission erred in concluding that the domestic
products were being undersold by the imports, and (4) that the
Commission used flawed financial data when concluding that the
491
domestic industry was in poor health.

The Federal Circuit first upheld the ITC’s finding that bulk and
492
consumer tissue paper constituted a single domestic like product.
483. Id.
484. Id. at 1382.
485. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2000).
486. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671e, 1673e (2000).
487. Cleo Inc. v. United States, 501 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Nippon Steel
Corp. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 494 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
488. 501 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
489. Id. at 1297.
490. Id. at 1294.
491. Id. at 1296.
492. Id. at 1298. The ITC weighs six factors in considering a like product
determination: (1) physical characteristics and uses; (2) common manufacturing
facilities and production employees; (3) interchangeability; (4) customer
perceptions; (5) channels of distribution; and, where appropriate, (6) price. Id. at
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The court found that bulk and consumer tissue paper were similar in
physical appearance and use, both coming from jumbo rolls of tissue
493
The
paper, and coming in a variety of sizes and colors.
manufacturing and production processes were also similar, in that
both were produced by the same companies on the same machines
494
On the other hand, there was only
run by the same employees.
limited overlap between the types of tissue paper with regard to
495
channels of distribution and price.
The evidence suggested that
496
consumer tissue paper is generally higher in price than bulk.
However, the Federal Circuit determined that the significant overlap
in physical characteristics and uses as well as in manufacturing
processes, and some overlap in the other factors was sufficient to find
that the Commission’s decision was supported by substantial
497
evidence.
The Federal Circuit also upheld the ITC’s determinations that the
dumped imports were causing the material injury to the domestic
tissue paper industry and that the volume of dumped tissue paper
498
The increase in
increased sharply over the period examined.
volume led to a transfer in market share from domestic producers to
the importers, resulting in a decline in the domestic tissue paper
499
industry. Also, the Federal Circuit upheld the ITC’s determination
that imported tissue paper was significantly undercutting the
500
domestic industry’s prices.
The ITC compared four categories of
goods: white consumer tissue paper, solid consumer tissue paper,
combination color consumer tissue paper, and white bulk tissue
501
paper.
The data showed that imports undersold the domestic
502
Therefore, the ITC’s
product a significant amount of time.
underlying determinations regarding the scope of the industry and
material injury analysis were found to be supported by substantial
503
evidence.

1295 (citing Torrington Co. v. United States, 938 F.2d 1278, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
NMB Sing. Ltd. v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1313 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2003);
Timken Co. v. United States, 913 F. Supp. 580, 584 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1996)).
493. Id. at 1297.
494. Id.
495. Id.
496. Id. at 1298.
497. Id.
498. Id. at 1300–01.
499. Id.
500. Id. at 1303.
501. Id. at 1302.
502. Id.
503. Id. at 1303.
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In the latest installment of Nippon Steel v. U.S. International Trade
504
Commission, the Federal Circuit reversed the CIT’s decision and
directed the CIT to reinstate the ITC’s affirmative material injury
505
determination.
The sunset review of Nippon Steel has a long
procedural history spanning more than six years, and including four
506
The
determinations by the ITC and six opinions from the CIT.
facts relevant to this case started in 2001, when the ITC “affirmatively
determined, by a three-to-three vote of the Commissioners, that
revocation of the antidumping and countervailing duty orders
covering [grain oriented electrical steel (“GOES”)] from Italy and
Japan was likely to cause material injury to an industry in the United
507
The matter was appealed and remanded twice with
States.”
508
affirmative material injury determinations.
On the third remand,
after re-opening the record, but before the voting, Commissioner
509
Neither the departing Commissioner
Miller left the Commission.
nor her replacement took part in the voting, resulting in a three-totwo negative determination that revocation of the orders would not
510
The CIT
likely cause material injury to the domestic industry.
511
affirmed this negative determination.
512
As in Tung Mung Development Co. v. United States, the government
attempted to portray the issue as involving an independent change of
513
agency policy.
In Tung Mung, the appellant steel company
challenged an interim CIT decision as improper because it failed to
give deference to Commerce’s decision to use a certain method when
514
calculating the appropriate antidumping duty. Here, in its analysis
of the issue, the Federal Circuit found that the change in the
Commission’s vote was solely a product of the departure of a
515
Commissioner. The court noted that a similar situation occurred in
516
Altx, Inc. v. United States, in which the court found that a change in
the identity of the voting Commissioners did not amount to an
517
independent policy change by the Commission.
Therefore, the
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.

494 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1381.
Id. at 1373.
Id. at 1373–74 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1374.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1375.
354 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Nippon Steel, 494 F.3d at 1375.
Tung Mung Dev., 354 F.3d at 1378.
Nippon Steel, 494 F.3d at 1376.
370 F.3d 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1118–19 n.8.
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Federal Circuit found that weighing the evidence differently than the
old majority of Commissioners did not amount to a change in
518
Commission practice or policy.
Also of note, the Federal Circuit found it appropriate to review the
remand order de novo, rather than for abuse of discretion, because
519
Namely, it
of the remand instructions it gave to the Commission.
gave two options on how to proceed: “(1) reopen the record in order
to obtain substantial evidence to support its adverse impact
conclusion or (2) make a determination that subject imports will
520
have no adverse impact should the orders be revoked.” This made
the remand order precisely the type that is reviewed de novo, and not
for abuse of discretion.
The Commission’s cumulation of imports, pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
§ 1675a(a)(7), was further upheld by the Federal Circuit as
521
supported by substantial evidence. The Commission has discretion
to “cumulatively assess the volume and effect of imports of the subject
merchandise from all countries with respect to reviews . . . [that] were
initiated on the same day, if such imports would be likely to compete
with each other and with domestic like products in the United States
522
market.”
The Commission reasoned that there was direct
competition between Italian and Japanese imports, that the like
domestic product was substitutable for the subject imports, and that
523
the two countries shared similar channels of distribution. Given the
evidence of higher prices for GOES in the United States, which
supported the finding that imports were likely to have an adverse
impact on the domestic industry, the Federal Circuit held that the
ITC’s material injury determination was supported by substantial
524
evidence.
The international trade decisions of the Federal Circuit show the
importance of keeping informed about evolving developments in
trade remedy matters, and not only when they involve products that a
company exports to, or imports into, the United States. The court’s
decisions on appeals from Commerce determinations also
demonstrate that, at least in the context of regulations interpreting
antidumping duty statutes, the Federal Circuit is likely to uphold
518. Nippon Steel, 494 F.3d at 1377–78.
519. Id. at 1378–79.
520. Id. at 1378 (quoting Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 391 F. Supp. 2d
1258, 1284 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2005)).
521. Id. at 1379–80.
522. Id. at 1379 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a)(7) (2000)).
523. Id.
524. Id. at 1380–81.

1196

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1145

Commerce’s position because the agency has been granted broad
discretion in such matters by Congress.
CONCLUSION
In 2007, The Federal Circuit decided thirty-four appeals from the
CIT, sixteen of which involved customs issues and eighteen of which
involved trade remedy issues. The Federal Circuit addressed a wide
range of international trade issues, representative of the varied and
complex nature of the international trade cases normally appealed to
the court. Although international trade appeals continue to be only
a small percentage of the Federal Circuit’s total caseload, these
appeals are very important, not only for the litigants, but also for
others who are similarly situated.

